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Introduction 
	  
On December 14, 2012, Adam Lanza, a mentally ill twenty-year-old man, murdered 
twenty-seven people with a Bushmaster AR-15 semiautomatic assault rifle at Sandy Hook 
Elementary School in Newtown, Connecticut.  His victims included twenty young children, six 
teachers, and his own mother.1  His mother had legally purchased this military-grade assault rifle 
from a gun shop.  Although twelve thousand gun murders occur each year, according to data 
collected by the gun-control advocacy group Everytown for Gun Safety, little action has been 
taken on the federal level to curb this epidemic of violence.2   
This time, however, the status quo on gun control seemed ripe for a change.  Public 
opinion polls showed a surge in the percentage of Americans who favored stronger gun control 
measures.  A bipartisan bill that would have extended criminal background checks to prospective 
gun buyers at gun shows and over the internet, the Manchin-Toomey bill, was crafted in 
response to the Sandy Hook shooting. A Gallup poll on the issue taken before the 2013 vote 
indicated that 91 percent of Americans favored passing a law that would require criminal 
background checks for all gun sales.3  The bill was defeated in the Senate in April 2013.4  After 
the San Bernardino, California shooting in December 2015, the bill was revived and voted down 
again, attracting even fewer votes in favor than it had in 2013.5 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 CNN.com, “Sandy Hook Shooting: What Happened,” CNN.com, December 14, 2012, 
http://www.cnn.com/interactive/2012/12/us/sandy-hook-timeline/.   
2 Everytown for Gun Safety, “Gun Violence by The Numbers,” Everytown for Gun Safety, 
https://everytownresearch.org/gun-violence-by-the-numbers/.   
3 Lydia Saad, “Americans Back Obama’s Proposals to Address Gun Violence,” Gallup, January 23, 2013, 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/160085/americans-back-obama-proposals-address-gun-violence.aspx.  
4 Aaron Blake, “Manchin-Toomey Gun Amendment Fails,” The Washington Post, April 17, 2013, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2013/04/17/manchin-toomey-gun-amendment-fails/.   
5 Kelsey Snell and Karoun Demirjian, “Senate Rejects Gun Control Amendments Offered Following San Bernardino 
Shooting,” The Washington Post, December 3, 2015, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/wp/2015/12/03/senate-democrats-to-force-gun-control-votes-in-
the-wake-of-the-san-bernardino-shooting/.   
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This lack of a legislative response on any other issue would be considered outrageous.  
Time and time again, Congress votes against gun control bills that contain measures which the 
majority of the American public supports.  This lack of legislative response is not new for gun 
control policy.  Federal gun control measures have been the subject of tooth-and-nail battles in 
Congress.  If these measures are passed at all, they are often stripped of any measures that would 
create substantive federal regulation of firearms during the legislative process, or are passed with 
a built-in sunset period, meaning that the law will expire in a set period of time unless Congress 
approves it again.  In most cases, Congress has declined to renew federal legislative measures 
regarding gun control that include this sunset period. 
 In my thesis, I investigate the factors that contribute to this seeming lack of federal 
legislative response to gun control to determine how and if there is a way forward to pass more 
effective gun laws on the federal level in the future.  Chapter One explains three of the most 
substantive federal gun control policies: The Federal Gun Control Act of 1968, the Brady Law, 
which was signed into law in 1993, and the Federal Assault Weapons Ban of 1994.  These three 
laws are instructive if one wishes to understand why federal gun control policy emerges from 
Congress without many of the provisions that the American public supports.  Chapter Two 
identifies prominent interest groups on both the pro-gun-control and pro-gun-rights side of the 
debate and the factors behind their influence, or lack thereof, on gun control policy on the federal 
level.  Chapter Two also explains certain theories in public policy that contribute to the difficulty 
of enacting strong gun control legislation on the federal level. 
Chapter Three examines public opinion polling and how it may be interpreted.  Although 
the majority of the American public supports a considerable number of mild to moderate gun 
control measures, as public opinion polling can attest, this is often a silent majority.  Chapter 
	   3 
Three provides an in-depth explanation for why public opinion polling might not be reflective of 
who is the most concerned about the issue of gun control. 
Lastly, Chapter Four summarizes recent policy initiatives regarding gun control.  In 
January 2016, President Obama announced an executive order that took some steps to combat 
gun violence, but this executive order has met with backlash from Congress.  Chapter Four also 
details potential policy solutions that could work around the stasis seen in Congress on gun 
control.  
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Chapter 1: Three Cases: The Gun Control Act of 1968, the Brady Law of 1993, and the 
Assault Weapons Ban of 1994 
	  
I. The Gun Control Act of 1968: Impetus and Objectives 
	  
Although hearings for provisions that would eventually become part of the Gun Control 
Act of 1968 began early in 1963, the impetus for Congress to introduce further restrictions on 
gun access did not truly arise until November of that year. Lee Harvey Oswald used a gun 
purchased through mail order to assassinate then-President John F. Kennedy on November 22, 
1963.6 President Lyndon B. Johnson introduced gun control legislation each year beginning in 
1965, but members of Congress declined to act until 1968, when the assassinations of Senator 
Robert F. Kennedy and civil rights leader Martin Luther King, Jr. galvanized support for gun 
control in both the public and their elected representatives.7  According to Harry Wilson, the 
nation’s grief over the back-to-back assassinations “...served to make the often silent voices of 
supporters of gun control more audible, while the cries of control opponents were largely 
muted.”8  Senator Thomas Dodd, D-CT, introduced a gun control bill in the Senate with two 
central provisions that were approved by the President himself: registration for all firearms and 
licensing of gun owners.9  The Chair of the Judiciary Committee, Emanuel Celler, D-NY, 
introduced the bill in the House.10  	  
Legislative Process 
Members of the House Judiciary Committee who disagreed with President Johnson’s gun 
control objectives immediately set out to weaken the bill, which they did successfully.11  Once it 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Harry L. Wilson, Guns, Gun Control, and Elections (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2007), 89.   
7 Ibid. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Robert J. Spitzer, The Politics of Gun Control (Boulder: Paradigm Publishers, 2012), 134.   
10 Ibid. 
11 Ibid.	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passed on to the House Rules Committee, the Committee Chair, William Colmer, a Democrat 
from Michigan and a staunch gun-rights proponent, negotiated with Celler for three weeks.12  
Ultimately, the bill moved out of the Rules Committee, but only after Celler agreed to “...oppose 
any efforts to add registration and licensing provisions to the bill on the floor of the House.”13  	  
President Johnson used some of the negotiation skills that he had honed for years as the 
Senate majority leader in order to rally habitual gun-control opponents around the Gun Control 
Act.  However, this required compromise on his end.  In exchange for his support of legislation 
that would authorize federal wiretapping, which he was previously against, “...the NRA agreed 
that, while it could not support the GCA, it would not consider GCA votes on the legislative 
report card when grading members of Congress A through F on their support of gun rights. This 
grading was and is one of the NRA’s most efficient tools for enabling political action by the 
membership.”14  This freed up certain members of Congress to vote in favor of the bill who 
would not support it otherwise.  Nevertheless, David Kopel reports, “...many congressmen voted 
“no” anyway, out of deference to their constituents.”15  The House passed the bill as HR 17735 
on June 21, 1968, after forty-five amendments were proposed and debated.16  The Senate passed 
the bill on September 18, after making various changes to weaken it even further.  President 
Johnson signed it into law on October 22.17	  
Provisions 
Neither of President Johnson’s primary objectives for the Gun Control Act of 1968 was 
achieved.  According to Wilson, this was “...largely due to the efforts of the NRA and other gun 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Ibid. 
13 Ibid. 
14 David B. Kopel, “The Great Gun Control War of the Twentieth Century--And Its Lessons for Gun Laws Today,” 
The Fordham Urban Law Journal 39, (2012): 1546-47. 
15 Kopel, “The Great Gun Control War of the Twentieth Century--And Its Lessons for Gun Laws Today,” 1547. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Spitzer, The Politics of Gun Control, 135.	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control opponents.”18  In spite of this, the Gun Control Act of 1968 was a great leap forward for 
federal gun control legislation.  Its provisions banned interstate sales of firearms, mail-order 
sales of long guns, and the sale of “Saturday Night Specials,” the popular term for cheap, 
imported handguns.19  It also created additional categories of people who would be prohibited 
from purchasing weapons, including “minors, drug addicts, mental incompetents, and convicted 
felons.”20  Licensing and record-keeping requirements for gun dealers and collectors were also 
reformed, though not to the extent that Johnson had originally envisioned.21  They were now 
required to “...keep a federal form (now known as Form 4473) detailing information for each 
sale, such as the gun’s model and serial number, the buyer’s name, address, age, race, and so on.  
The forms would be available for government inspection and for criminal investigations, but the 
forms would not be collected in a central registration list.”22  Additionally, the Gun Control Act 
of 1968 created a federal oversight bureau, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, to 
regulate these new measures.23  	  
Outcome	  
Robert Spitzer describes the Gun Control Act of 1968 as legislation whose 
 scope was modest, and as a consequence, its impact was minimal.  Gun control 
opponents nevertheless immediately set to work to erode the act, if not overturn it 
entirely.  One year later… Congress repealed a provision of the act requiring sellers 
of shotgun and rifle ammunition to register purchasers.24   
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Wilson, Guns, Gun Control, and Elections, 89. 
19 Kopel, “The Great Gun Control War of the Twentieth Century--And Its Lessons for Gun Laws Today,” 1543.    
20 Spitzer, The Politics of Gun Control, 135. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Kopel, “The Great Gun Control War of the Twentieth Century--And Its Lessons for Gun Laws Today,” 1545-46. 
23 Wilson, Guns, Gun Control, and Elections, 90. 
24 Spitzer, The Politics of Gun Control, 137.	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Wilson identifies the area of the bill with the most impact as the restrictions on interstate 
firearms sales, though “...this was probably never a large proportion of firearm sales.”25   Other 
types of guns that were restricted increased in either production or importation nonetheless. 
Shotguns that did not meet the criteria for a Saturday Night Special were still imported, and 
domestic handgun production actually increased in response to the limitations placed on gun 
imports.26  Franklin Zimring reports that domestic handgun production increased steadily post-
1968, estimating that domestic production of handguns for civilian use peaked dramatically at 
over one million in 1968 for the first time and increased every subsequent year until 1972, when 
production rose to 1,667,000.  Domestic production fell the year after to 1,609,000 handguns.27 It 
also led to an increase in the number of gun dealers.28  Zimring found that the creation of the 
ATF and the fact that the 1968 Gun Control Act necessitated licensing dealers were intended to  
reduce the number of persons applying for licenses, thereby making meaningful 
regulation of dealer activities feasible. But the higher fee was offset by the fact that, 
after the Act, the only way to receive firearms in interstate commerce was to obtain 
a federal license.  The number of dealer and collector licenses in effect never 
dropped below 60,000 and is currently estimated to be at 160,000, compared to 
about 100,000 in the early 1960s.29   
 
The Gun Control Act of 1968 was successful in decreasing the number of imported 
handguns.  Zimring found that “handgun imports in 1969, the first year under the Gun Control 
Act, were less than a third of 1968’s record volume of 1,155,000, and importation has never 
exceeded one-third of the 1968 total.”30   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Wilson, Guns, Gun Control, and Elections, 90. 
26 Spitzer, The Politics of Gun Control, 136-137.  
27 Franklin E. Zimring, “Firearms and Federal Law: The Gun Control Act of 1968,” The Journal of Legal Studies, 4, 
1, (January 1975), 169. 
28 Spitzer, The Politics of Gun Control, 136.   
29 Zimring, “Firearms and Federal Law: The Gun Control Act of 1968,” 159. 
30 Zimring, “Firearms and Federal Law: The Gun Control Act of 1968,” 167. 
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Lastly, it appears that the Gun Control Act of 1968 had a negligible effect on crime.  In 
fact, Zimring finds that gun violence in the years 1966 through 1973 was characterized by 
“…explosive growth in the rate of handgun usage in the period 1966-1969 followed by three 
years in which handgun violence continued to grow, but at a more modest rate.”31 	  
II. The Brady Law (1993): Impetus and Objectives 
	  
The Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act (known as the Brady Law), enacted in 
1993, amended the Gun Control Act of 1968.32  The law was named in honor of James Brady, 
President Ronald Reagan’s press secretary, who was shot in the head in 1981 and became 
permanently disabled during an assassination attempt against Reagan.33  Brady’s wife, Sarah, 
became the president of Handgun Control, Inc., one of the foremost gun-control advocacy 
groups, and, with her help, the organization began to lobby Congress in the late 1980s until the 
early 1990s.34  Their objective for the next federal gun-control law was to create both a waiting 
period and a background check for purchasing handguns.35  They hoped that the background 
check would prevent those who should not possess handguns from buying them, and “the 
waiting period would serve as a cooling-off period for those who would buy a gun in a fit of 
homicidal passion or rage or during a period of suicidal thoughts.”36  However, HCI and other 
gun control advocates knew how to pick their battles; the background check would be imposed 
only on	   
handgun sales by federally licensed dealers.  Long guns and the secondary market 
were left untouched.  Sales reports would be sent to local authorities, not to the 
federal government, and these reports would have to be destroyed relatively soon 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 Zimring, “Firearms and Federal Law: The Gun Control Act of 1968,” 170. 
32 Spitzer, The Politics of Gun Control, 147.  
33 Kopel, “The Great Gun Control War of the Twentieth Century--And Its Lessons for Gun Laws Today,” 1567.    
34 Wilson, Guns, Gun Control, and Elections, 93. 
35 Ibid.   
36 Ibid.	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after the transaction was completed.  This would, in effect, prevent the 
establishment of gun registration.37 
 
Legislative Process	  
Howard Metzenbaum, D-OH, introduced the Brady Bill in the Senate and Edward 
Feighan, D-OH, introduced it in the House early in 1987.38  The NRA objected to its provisions 
almost immediately, claiming that “...it would simply be a prelude to stronger regulation, that it 
would not stop criminals from getting guns, and that it merely inconvenienced those entitled to 
guns.”39  It was put to a vote in the House in September of 1988, but the original bill was 
weakened by House members who substituted an NRA-supported amendment about the 
proposed waiting period.40  The bill died in the House and was not taken up again until 1990.41  
Reflecting on the failure of the original Brady Bill, Representative Feighan attributed its lack of 
success to the lobbying efforts of the NRA, who had spent, according to the organization’s own 
estimate, between 1.5 and 3 million dollars on a media campaign and grassroots efforts to 
suppress any support for the bill.42  He acknowledged the NRA’s hold on legislators, saying that 
“...at least two dozen House members had privately spoke of their support for the bill but had 
refused to vote for it, not because they feared losing their seats but because of “the aggravation” 
that accompanied opposing the NRA.”43  	  
 The House finally passed the Brady Bill, with its original seven-day waiting period intact, 
in May of 1991.44  In order to do so, however, the House had to vote against an NRA-backed 
replacement bill that would have instituted an instant computerized background check in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 Wilson, Guns, Gun Control, and Elections, 94. 
38 Spitzer, The Politics of Gun Control, 148. 
39 Ibid.   
40 Ibid.   
41 Ibid.   
42 Ibid.   
43 Ibid. 
44 Ibid.	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place of the seven-day waiting period.45  Most states were not operating with fully automated 
records, and the expense of developing a computerized instant-check system and digitizing 
records would be astronomical.46  The NRA was fully aware of the limitations of their alternate 
plan.  The strategy behind it was not to present a viable alternative, but simply to appear to do so.  
Spitzer explains the NRA’s logic:	  
The political strategy behind the...proposal was based on the principle that a motion 
is easier to defeat if the opposition has something to offer in its place.  By proposing 
an alternative of little or no feasibility, the NRA and its allies were offering a plan 
that seemed to offer a meaningful reform yet posed no actual change in gun-
purchasing procedures for many years to come.47  
	  
 Although this alternate version was ultimately not approved in the House, the Senate 
made changes to two of the Brady Bill’s most important provisions.48  The waiting period to buy 
a handgun was reduced to five days instead of seven, and the Brady Bill was integrated into an 
omnibus crime bill as an attempt at bipartisan compromise.49  In spite of this effort, Senate 
Republicans filibustered the bill during a floor vote on March 19, 1992, forcing the bill’s 
sponsors to withdraw it after their effort to invoke cloture failed to garner the required sixty 
votes.50  A similar process occurred when the bill was reintroduced on October 2.51  	  
 The bill finally attracted support in late 1993, when gun-control supporters agreed to 
adopt the five-day waiting period instead of the seven days that had been proposed originally.52  
The bill was approved by the Senate on November 24 of that year, but not before the NRA 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 Ibid. 
46 Spitzer, The Politics of Gun Control, 149. 
47 Ibid. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Ibid. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Spitzer, The Politics of Gun Control, 150.	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extracted a compromise from the pro-gun control supporters of the Brady Bill.53   The 
amendments made to the bill at the suggestion of the NRA included “...requirements that 
background check records of sales to lawful purchasers be destroyed, and that the Brady 
handgun waiting period would sunset within five years, replaced by the National Instant Check 
System.”54 These new measures upset supporters of the original version of the bill, because 
“…many states had waiting periods longer than five days, and the move was seen as a violation 
of states’ rights.”55  The compromise occurred because Senate Republicans filibustered the 
original Brady Bill, which had more stringent requirements, like a longer waiting period, until 
Senate leaders from both sides of the aisle agreed to consider the alternate, NRA-backed version 
in a floor vote.56 President Clinton signed the Brady Bill into law on November 30.57	  
Provisions 
Ultimately, the Brady Law included the five-day waiting period for handgun purchases.  
Its other provisions included allocating funds for states to upgrade and computerize their 
criminal records so the National Instant Check System could be implemented, increased firearms 
licensing fees, made theft of firearms from licensed dealers a federal crime, required police 
notification for sales of multiple handguns, and, most contentiously, “...stated that police must 
make a “reasonable effort” to check the backgrounds of gun buyers.”58  States that had their own 
systems for background checks for firearms purchases and handgun licensing were exempt from 
the provisions of the Brady Law.59   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 Ibid.   
54 Kopel, “The Great Gun Control War of the Twentieth Century--And Its Lessons for Gun Laws Today,” 1582-
1583. 
55 Spitzer, The Politics of Gun Control, 150. 
56 Ibid. 
57 Ibid. 
58 Spitzer, The Politics of Gun Control, 151.	  
59 Wilson, Guns, Gun Control, and Elections, 95. 
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“A Reasonable Effort”: Police Background Checks and Printz v. United States	  
 The police background check for handgun purchases was, by and large, the most 
controversial provision of the Brady Law.  Since the law mandated that a system for a national 
instant criminal background check would be created and instituted within five years, an alternate 
method to perform background checks was necessary until the National Instant Criminal 
Background Check System could be implemented.60  The alternate method “...required the 
assistance of authorized firearms dealers and state chief law enforcement officers (CLEOS)...”61  
who were supposed to make “...a reasonable effort to ascertain...whether receipt or possession 
[of the handgun] would be in violation of the law.”62  Two sheriffs, Jay Printz of Montana and 
Richard Mack of Arizona, challenged this provision on Tenth Amendment grounds, alleging that 
“congressional action compelling state officers to execute federal laws is unconstitutional.”63  
The Supreme Court ultimately agreed in 1997.64   
Writing for the majority, Justice Antonin Scalia concluded that permitting the federal 
government to “impress into its service--and at no cost to itself--the police officers of the [fifty] 
States” would violate the protection of dual sovereignty set forth by the Framers in the 
Constitution.”65  Requiring that police be the agents conducting the background checks at the 
behest of a federal law was also determined to violate the separation of powers outlined in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 Joe Schrantz, “Interim Provisions of the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act Commanding State and Local 
Law Enforcement Officers to Conduct Background Checks on Prospective Handgun Purchasers Violates the 
Constitution--Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365,” Seton Hall Constitutional Law Journal, 649, 9, (1999), 652.   
61  “Printz v. United States (n.d.).”  Legal Information Institute, Accessed 11 February 2016, 
https://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/95-1478.ZO.html.     
62 Ibid.   
63 Schrantz, “Interim Provisions of the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act Commanding State and Local Law 
Enforcement Officers to Conduct Background Checks on Prospective Handgun Purchasers Violates the 
Constitution--Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365,” 654.   
64 Ibid.   
65 Printz v. United States (n.d.).	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Constitution.  The President is supposed to be responsible for the administration of laws enacted 
by Congress.66  Transferring this responsibility to police officers by compelling them to conduct 
background checks on prospective handgun purchasers would effectively bypass executive 
control.  According to Justice Scalia, this would result in transferring “this responsibility to 
thousands of CLEOS in the [fifty] States, who are left to implement the program without 
meaningful Presidential control,” thereby undermining the power of the Executive branch.67  As 
a result of the Printz decision, police were no longer required to conduct the background checks 
by law.  Instead, President Clinton urged the states to continue to perform background checks of 
prospective handgun buyers on a voluntary basis.68	  
Outcome	  
Wilson admits that, ultimately, “it is difficult to assess the impact of the Brady Bill.”69  
The system has been effective in certain respects, particularly in preventing handgun purchases 
from licensed dealers by prospective buyers with criminal records, domestic violence 
convictions, or restraining orders.70  It also led to a drastic decrease in the number of federally 
licensed dealers, due to the license fee increase.  By 2007 there were only about 50,000 such 
dealers, down from 285,000 the year before the Brady Law was put into place.71  However, due 
to privacy laws, the system has been ineffective in identifying and preventing gun purchases by 
people who are mentally ill or drug users.72 The Virginia Tech shooting in 2007, where a 
mentally ill college student murdered thirty-three people with two semiautomatic handguns, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66 Schrantz, “Interim Provisions of the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act Commanding State and Local Law 
Enforcement Officers to Conduct Background Checks on Prospective Handgun Purchasers Violates the 
Constitution--Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365,” 654.   
67 Printz v. United States (n.d.).  
68Spitzer, The Politics of Gun Control, 151. 
69Wilson, Guns, Gun Control, and Elections, 95. 
70 Ibid. 
71 Spitzer, The Politics of Gun Control, 151. 
72 Wilson, Guns, Gun Control, and Elections, 95. 
	  	   14 
highlighted the gaps in record-keeping resulting from the weakness of the Brady Law.73  At the 
time, only twenty-two states submitted their mental health records to NICS, as the Brady Law 
made no provisions to enforce compliance with its record-keeping requirements.74  The NICS 
Improvement Amendments Act of 2007 “...now requires all states to submit appropriate mental 
health records and also provided a procedure whereby those judged mentally incompetent to own 
a firearm could petition to have the right restored.”75	  
Additionally, the Brady Law, by nature of its compromise, undermined stronger efforts 
by not regulating secondary sellers, including gun shows and antiques dealers.  Although the 
Brady Law has prevented many people who should not possess handguns from purchasing them 
through licensed dealers, it is likely that those denied because of the background check will turn 
to either straw buyers or the secondary market.76  Referring to a study on handgun use in 
homicide and suicide, two primary reasons cited for the waiting period and background check 
that were originally provisions of the Brady Law, Wilson says that “Ludwig and Cook [the 
authors of the study] found no statistically significant effect of the Brady Bill.”77   
Jens Ludwig and Frederick Cook studied the impact of the Brady Act, specifically its 
provisions for a waiting period and a background check, on homicide and suicide rates.  After 
analyzing National Center for Health Statistics data between the years 1985 and 1997, years both 
before and after the Brady Law went into effect, Ludwig and Cook found that 
“…implementation of the Brady Act appears to have been associated with reductions in the 
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firearm suicide rate for persons aged 55 years or older but not with reductions in homicide acts 
or overall suicide rates.”78 	  
 The sunset of the five-day waiting period after 1998 and the introduction of the National 
Instant Criminal Background Check System also impacted the law’s effectiveness.  The NICS, 
unlike the interim background check, applies to all firearms.79  The National Instant Criminal 
Background Check System created allows “any licensee [to] contact, by telephone or by other 
electronic means in addition to the telephone, for information on whether receipt of a firearm by 
a prospective transferee would violate Federal or State law.”80  NICS has allowed for 95 percent 
of the background checks to be completed within a two-hour window.81  By 2000, 26 states had 
their own background check system, meaning that they are no longer bound to the national 
system established by the Brady Law.82  	  
III. Assault Weapons Ban (1994): Impetus and Objectives 
 
Many pro-gun-control groups, including Handgun Control, Inc., grew more politically 
sophisticated as time went on and were able to replicate the lobbying and organizational tactics 
that the NRA had used successfully in the past.83  This included a public education campaign that 
“...emphasized injuries and deaths of children by gunshot, and the need to impose gun safety 
laws.”84  This public education and the growing public interest in gun control came to a head in 
response to a January 1989 shooting where a mentally ill man named Patrick Purdy murdered 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78 Jens Ludwig and Philip Cook, “Homicide and Suicide Rates Associated with Implementation of the Brady 
Handgun Violence Prevention Act,” Journal of the American Medical Association, 284, 5, (August 2000), 585. 
79 Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms.  Department of the Treasury. “Implementation of Public Law 103-159, 
Relating to the Permanent Provisions of the Handgun Violence Prevention Act,” 2, 
https://www.ttb.gov/rrd/td415.pdf.   
80 Ibid. 
81Spitzer, The Politics of Gun Control, 151. 
82 Ibid. 
83Spitzer, The Politics of Gun Control, 141.	  
84Kopel, “The Great Gun Control War of the Twentieth Century--And Its Lessons for Gun Laws Today,” 1584. 
	  	   16 
five children and wounded twenty-nine others on a playground in Stockton, California.85  He was 
armed with an AK-47.86  Moved by the situation, President George H.W. Bush levied a 
temporary ban on the import of certain types of assault rifles in March of 1989.87  An executive 
order by President Clinton expanded the ban to assault-style handguns in 1993.88  Various 
attempts to pass an assault weapons ban languished in Congress between 1989 and 1991.89	  
Legislative Process 
In November of 1993, the Senate banned the manufacture of nineteen types of assault 
weapons.  However, it did not address guns of this type that had already been produced, and 
exempted more than six-hundred and fifty types of hunting weapons.90  The outlook for the 
House to approve the bill was dim until President Clinton threw his support behind an assault 
weapons ban.91  The House took up the matter in 1994.  Eager to move forward, Clinton 
advocated for an early vote in the House, which was ultimately the wrong decision. The bill was 
rejected on August 11 by a vote of 225 to 210.92  Clinton rallied the support of police 
organizations and his cabinet members and pushed Congressional leaders to act on the bill once 
again.  The House renegotiated the bill, fielding fierce lobbying attempts from the NRA to get it 
to drop the assault weapons ban.93  Ultimately, the bill passed, and Clinton signed the Violent 
Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act, of which the assault weapons ban was Title XI.94	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Provisions 
	  
The Assault Weapons Ban prohibited by law the sale and possession of nineteen types of 
weapons, as well as “copycat” weapons that included at least two characteristics of the types that 
were explicitly banned.95  Six-hundred and sixty-one rifles used for sporting purposes were 
specifically exempted, as were existing assault-style rifles.96  Gun clips holding more than ten 
bullets were also banned.97  It also proposed the prohibition of gun possession by anyone with a 
domestic violence restraining order against them.98  An additional provision of the assault 
weapons ban gave Congress the power of review to include more gun types under the Assault 
Weapons Ban.99   
After Republicans won control of Congress in the 1994 elections, the Assault Weapons 
Ban barely survived a repeal vote in 1996.100  Republicans, including the Senate majority leader, 
Robert Dole, and the House Speaker, Newt Gingrich, “…publicly pledged to make repeal of the 
assault weapons ban a top priority.”101 Although they ultimately did not succeed in repealing it 
before its automatic sunset in 2004, 183 Republican members of Congress voted to repeal the 
ban in March of 1996.102 Repealing the assault weapons ban had been a priority of many 
Republicans in Congress since its passage.  It was saved by the vanity of Senate majority leader 
Robert Dole, who was running for president and thought that repealing the assault weapons ban 
would hurt his popularity with the American public.103   An August 1994 Gallup poll found that 
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seventy-one percent of Americans “…favored banning the manufacture, sale, and possession of 
the much narrower category of guns labeled “assault rifles,” though this dropped to 57% by April 
1996.”104	  
Outcome 
The Assault Weapons Ban was self-defeating.  By including a sunset clause for the entire 
law after ten years, it ensured its own downfall.105  Despite its popularity with the American 
public, 68% of whom favored the measure, it expired in 2004.106  	  
 While it was active, however, the Assault Weapons Ban’s effectiveness was limited.  
Several scholars, including Wilson and Kopel, point to its unnecessary focus on the outward 
appearance, rather than the inward function, of the types of assault rifles as one of the ban’s 
illogical provisions.107  Kopel writes that:  
on close inspection, the assault weapon ban was mostly about appearances...the 
generic definition focused on accessories such as bayonet lugs and adjustable 
stocks...manufacturers simply removed the prohibited features, renamed the guns, 
and were soon selling firearms that in internal operation were operationally the 
same as the banned guns.108   
 
Wilson is more sympathetic, and explains the logic behind this: 	  
The vague definition [of what constitutes an assault weapon] was the result of the 
bill’s proponents choosing the path of least political resistance.  A more specific 
definition would have included all semiautomatic guns, which would have greatly 
increased the number of gun owners who were impacted by the law and would 
likely have doomed it to failure.109 
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 Apart from its focus on the outward appearance of assault weapons instead of their 
performance capabilities, the Assault Weapons Ban led to a surge in manufacturing just before 
the ban took place.110  This led to lowered prices on these weapons after the ban and increased 
availability on both the primary and secondary markets.111 Christopher Koper and Jeffrey Roth, 
in their 2002 study of the short-term primary and secondary market effects of the Assault 
Weapons Ban on gun markets, examined several factors related to the accessibility of guns to 
criminals, including “…production and price trends in legal and illegal markets.”112  They 
modeled three possible situations of the effects of the Assault Weapons Ban on the primary 
(which encompasses “…transactions by federally-licensed gun manufacturers, importers, 
distributors, and retail dealers”113) and secondary markets (which are “…second-hand gun 
transactions made by non-licensed individuals”114) for purchasing assault weapons.    
These scenarios included a “market non-response model,” which would entail no effect 
of the ban on demand for assault weapons, causing a “diminishing assault weapon stock and 
rising prices,” leading to a gradual reduction in criminal use of assault weapons.115  This scenario 
was determined to be invalid because of the long legislative process for the Assault Weapons 
Ban that received extensive media coverage.  Koper and Roth hypothesize that “…this publicity 
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may have affected both supply and demand for AWs [assault weapons] even before the ban took 
effect.”116   
Their second model, hypothesizing “speculative demand,” suggests that demand for 
assault weapons began rising prior to the debate about the Assault Weapons Ban.  They found 
that increased demand would have created an increase in prices for assault weapons in both the 
primary and secondary markets for the models that seemed the most likely to be banned.117  This 
increase in price and demand before the assault weapons ban would have resulted in a sharper 
reduction in criminal assault weapons use earlier than occurred in the market non-response 
model.118   
The third model, which Koper and Roth call “speculative demand and response,” 
hypothesizes that demand in this model would act in the same manner as the speculative demand 
model, but, before the ban was put into place, all components of the supply chain, including 
manufacturers, wholesalers, and retailers, “…would have responded to the pre-ban price increase 
by increasing their production of sales volumes…Manufacturers also responded to the ban by 
introducing, or more heavily marketing, “legal substitute” models that escape the ban but closely 
resemble the banned models.”119  The supply of “grandfathered” existing assault weapons and 
the new copy-cat models would satisfy the demand for assault weapons and lead to a decrease in 
prices for assault weapons in both the primary and secondary markets.  Any decrease in criminal 
use resulting from the temporary rise in prices before the ban would be “…followed by a 
rebound [in criminal use of assault weapons] of infinite duration.”120  
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 To test these three models, Koper and Roth examined “pre- and post-ban primary market 
data on [assault weapons] to directly measure trends in primary market availability and indirectly 
approximate trends in secondary market availability.”121  They then applied the data about 
pricing trends for assault weapons to the criminal use of assault weapons, involving data about 
gun seizures by the police to “…approximate trends in criminal use of [assault weapons].”122  
Ultimately, the findings from Koper and Roth’s data modeling showed that: 
Speculation during the Congressional debate about the ban caused a substantial but 
temporary increase in the price of [assault weapons] around the time of its 
enactment, leading to a decrease in the availability of these weapons to criminals 
in the short-term aftermath of the ban.  However, prices began falling after the ban, 
due apparently to a surge in [assault weapons] production (and production of very 
similar but non-banned gun models) just before the ban became effective…we 
expect to see some temporary rebound in criminal use of [assault weapons]  as the 
pre-ban weapons are resold before seeing a gradual attrition in the stock of [assault 
weapons].123   
 
Koper and Roth found that prices for assault weapons were at their peak “…when the ban 
became effective in the latter part of 1994 and remained high through the first half of 1995.  In the 
second half of 1995…the prices declined to levels comparable to the pre-ban period.”124  Their 
findings about assault weapons production between 1989 and 1994, the year the ban was put in 
place, indicate that  
production of all categories increased in 1993, which is anecdotally described as a 
year in which gun manufacturers, sellers, and consumers feared the new Clinton 
administration would pursue and achieve broad gun control legislation (e.g. the 
Brady Bill).  However, in 1994, as the narrow coverage of the [assault weapons] 
ban took shape during Congressional debate, production of all the banned 
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categories…increased substantially over their 1989-93 averages while production 
of the non-banned…models fell.125  
 
This data ultimately supported their speculative demand response model.126  The effects 
of the higher prices in both the primary and secondary markets in the time period immediately 
following the assault weapons ban resulted in assault weapons becoming  
At least temporarily less accessible to criminal users…However, the excess stock 
and falling prices of [assault weapons] in primary markets by 1996 should translate 
into greater availability of [assault weapons] in both primary and secondary 
markets. This effect could be intensified if some unscrupulous dealers and 
collectors who paid high speculative prices for [assault weapons] that subsequently 
lost value became more willing to sell the guns to illegal users for a premium.  
Consequently, we predict that the reduction in criminal use of [assault weapons] 
will be followed by an upswing of indefinite duration, particularly if prices for the 
banned weapons remain low.127 
  
Wilson summarizes the conclusions of the Koper and Roth study of the market 
availability of assault weapons as: “Although Christopher Koper and Jeffrey Roth found a small 
decline in homicide that might be attributable to the ban, they also acknowledged that the 
number of banned weapons sold in the months prior to implementation date increased by 120 
percent.  Kleck argues that the ban could have prevented no more than two homicides 
annually.”128  Philip Cook and Kristin Goss write that “there is no compelling evidence that it 
[the 1994 Assault Weapons Ban] saved lives.  A more stringent or longer-lasting ban might well 
have been more effective.”129 
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IV. Commonalities and Lessons from the Three Cases 
	  
 Analysis of these three cases shows several points of similarity regarding the relative 
weakness of federal gun control policy. One of these categories is the strength and influence of 
lobbying and interest groups. These include the involvement of the NRA through lobbying 
efforts and their influence over legislators through their “report card” evaluation of legislators’ 
support of gun rights, as well as the weak position of gun-control advocacy groups, especially in 
contrast to the power of gun-rights groups like the NRA.  The second category of similarity is the 
perception of gun ownership as a right.  Gun rights vs. gun control is able to be portrayed as a 
conflict of opposing ideologies; this is reflected through constituent beliefs and reactions.  Pew 
Research Center has been asking since 1993 “what do you think is more important—to protect 
the rights of Americans to own guns or to control gun ownership?”  Researchers have found that 
it has been a topic where  
there is no indication that people have any difficulty answering this question or are 
ambivalent about the topic.  In fact, when asked a follow-up about the strength of 
their opinion, 81% of those who said it is more important to control gun ownership 
felt strongly about that position; 91% of those who said it is more important to 
control gun ownership felt strongly.130  
 
This complete polarization of the issue, as well as the public’s strong adherence to their 
chosen side of the issue, shows that people see gun rights and gun control as polar, irreconcilable 
opposites.   
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The third category is the legislation itself.  In order to ensure passage, federal gun control 
laws often build in compromise measures that paralyze or weaken their effectiveness.  These 
three categories of limitations will be discussed in Chapter Two.
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Chapter 2: What Makes Gun Control Legislation So Difficult? 
 
I. Social Regulatory Policy 
The inherent issue with the American people’s conception of gun regulations, according 
to Robert J. Spitzer, in The Politics of Gun Control, is the result of a tendency to resist 
governmental control of individual behavior.131  Policy that aims to regulate or restrict the 
conduct of individuals that produces direct consequences to their behavior has a high probability 
of generating controversy among citizens.132  He says that “whenever the government seeks to 
apply its coercive powers directly to shape individual conduct, the prospect of controversy is 
great, especially in a nation with a long tradition of individualism.”133  Spitzer quotes the policy 
analyst Theodore J. Lowi regarding government coercion of individual behavior: 
When the likelihood of government coercion is immediate—that is, when the 
behavior of individual citizens is directly affected, as in the case of regulation—the 
prospect of controversy is high.  When the likelihood of government coercion is 
remote—that is, when the primary purpose of the policy in question is, say, to 
provide benefits rather than regulate individual conduct—the prospect of 
controversy is low.134 
 
Gun control’s categorization as a social regulatory policy, defined as “the exercise of 
legal authority to affirm, modify, or replace community values, moral practices, and norms of 
interpersonal conduct,” creates another layer of controversy.135  Spitzer writes that social 
regulatory policy, which is “…concerned with broader issues of public safety, health or 
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morals…greatly expanded at the national level in the 1960s.”136 The Gun Control Act of 1968 
was the most stringent gun control measure of that era.  
As an area of social regulatory policy, gun control is an issue that is very easily 
politicized.137  Spitzer enumerates four political traits of social regulatory policy, all of which 
will be discussed in detail in this chapter: “the prevalence of single-issue groups,” grassroots 
activism, public opinion, and political parties.138 
Gun control has created and sustained a variety of single-issue groups, both pro-gun 
rights and pro-gun control.  The groups, with their singular focus and intense sentiments about 
the issue at hand, are “…highly motivated to defend what they believe are fundamental and very 
personal values.”139  This absolutist view, which pits the members of the organization against its 
external “enemies,” who do not feel the same way about the issue, encourages political 
participation within interest groups.140 
The second political element of social regulatory policy, grassroots activism, shows that 
political influence transcends organized, professional lobbying groups.  The pressure coming 
from citizens acting outside the federal government can, according to Spitzer, “…have a 
profound effect on how national political leaders respond to these issues.”141 
The third area, public opinion, has the potential to influence areas of social regulatory 
policy, but does not reliably inspire or effect change. Because most citizens do not mobilize with 
the frequency or intensity of members of single-issue groups, individual events, like murders, 
assassinations, or a rise in crime, and the reaction of key groups to these events, have the 
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potential to harness public opinion to create policy change.142  However, public opinion 
motivates action on issues of gun control less frequently than some of the other traits of social 
regulatory policy.  Philip J. Cook and Kristin A. Goss find that the effects of high-profile 
shootings on public opinion about gun policy impact it only “sometimes—but not by much, and 
the effects usually don’t last long.”143 This kind of short term surge without a long-term effect in 
public support for stricter gun control laws after tragic gun-related events, most commonly 
school shootings, is significant.  We have to ask what makes public opinion so changeable 
regarding this issue and why the public’s memory of these events does not sustain a consistent 
pro-control sentiment.   The topic of public opinion in relation to various aspects of gun control 
will be further discussed in Chapter 3. 
The final political trait of social regulatory policy is political parties.  They often use social 
regulatory policy issues like gun control to appeal to constituents who align with their views on 
these issues.144  Cook and Goss note that, “by and large, Democrats favor stricter gun laws, while 
Republicans favor either keeping the laws the same or in some cases liberalizing them.”145  This 
clear divergence of opinion on the issue began in the 1970s, when “…Republican platforms 
increasingly emphasized support for the Second Amendment and the right of self-defense, as 
well as opposition to certain gun laws.  Meanwhile, the Democrats called for various new gun 
laws…”146  Party opinion on these issues is strongly correlated to each party’s core political 
constituent base.  Cook and Goss note that: 
Republicans are strongest in the South and in rural areas, where gun ownership is 
widespread and reflective of strong traditions of individualism and distrust of 
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government.  Democrats are strongest in urban areas and among women and racial 
minorities, who either lack a gun-owning tradition or see the dangers up close.  Not 
surprisingly, then, the partisan divide shows up in public opinion polls.147 
 
The Pew Research Center’s 2014 survey of the demographics and political beliefs of gun-
owning households supports Cook and Goss’ findings.  The South, where 38 percent of 
households own a gun, leads all other regions in gun ownership.148  People living in rural and 
suburban areas are also, according to Pew, far more likely to own guns than those residing in 
urban areas. 51 percent of people who claim gun ownership are rural residents, followed by 
suburban residents, 36 percent, and, lastly, urban residents, at a rate of 25 percent.149  Pew’s 
analysis of the percentages of members of political and racial or ethnic groups who own guns 
corroborates the relation between political party affiliation, race and gun ownership.  Whites are 
most likely to own a firearm and make up 41 percent of gun owners, while blacks own guns at a 
rate of 19 percent, and Hispanics at 20 percent.150  49 percent of gun owners are Republican, 37 
percent are Independent, and 22 percent are Democrats.151 
II. Stakeholders 
Pro-gun-control Groups: The Brady Campaign 
The Brady Campaign was originally established in 1974 as the National Council to 
Control Handguns.  Later, the group changed its name to Handgun Control, Inc.152  Prior to the 
creation of NCCH, there was “no significant organized gun control movement.”153  The 
organization was created by Mark Borinsky, a shooting victim, Ed Welles, a retired CIA agent, 
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and Pete Shields, a prominent executive at DuPont whose son had died in a random shooting.154  
Their early success stemmed from their ability to, as Wilson explains, “translate their personal 
tragedies into a public policy issue;” victims and families of victims came together to assert that 
a social problem existed and could be addressed through gun control measures.155  Although the 
organization was initially welcomed by certain members of Congress, NCCH realized that their 
goal, which was an outright ban of handguns, was not politically viable.  After six years, it was 
clear to the organization’s leaders that “neither the public nor Congress supported an outright ban 
and the pursuit of such a policy would be fruitless and possibly detrimental to the 
organization.”156  The public’s levels of support for a total and outright ban of handguns has 
traditionally been very low, and the idea of a total ban on handguns has remained consistently 
unpopular, according to public opinion polling.157  NCCH realized that, in order to have 
longevity as an organization and to retain credibility and appeal among both Congress and the 
American public, their efforts would have to be more modest and incremental.158 Under a new 
name, a compromised platform, and Shields’ leadership, the group attracted over one hundred 
thousand members and contributed $75,000 to the 1980 Congressional campaign cycle.159  They 
founded their outreach organization, the Center to Prevent Handgun Violence, in 1983, and their 
legal organization, the Legal Action Project, in 1989.160  
Sarah and Jim Brady’s involvement with Handgun Control, Inc., starting in 1985, further 
increased the influence of the organization. Sarah Brady’s role was to serve as 
…an eloquent spokesperson and put a recognizable face on HCI.  Often appearing 
with her husband, who was confined to a wheelchair and whose speech was slurred 
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as a result of the wounds he sustained, Brady raised the profile of the group and 
opened doors that had previously been closed.  Her credentials, as the daughter of 
a Republican activist and an FBI agent, as well as her husband’s, as the press 
secretary to the conservative Republican President Reagan, added significantly to 
the clout of HCI.161 
 
HCI, in acknowledgement of the Brady’s recognition factor among the general public, 
changed their name a second time, to the Brady Campaign to Prevent Gun Violence, in 2001.162  
To assess the overall impact and effectiveness of the Brady Campaign, one has to take into 
account the fact that they operate at a size and budget that is approximately one-tenth of the 
NRA’s.163  With a more limited budget and reach than that of the NRA, the Brady Campaign has 
still managed to emerge as a worthy opponent for the NRA and is the “preeminent gun control 
advocate in the country.”164  Their lobbying efforts were key to securing the Brady Bill in 1993. 
In spite of the fact that the Brady Bill was diminished greatly in its impact between its 
original draft and the final bill, it was arguably only passed at all due to “the tenacity of Sarah 
Brady and the relatively modest goals of the legislation and HCI.”165  The bill itself was gutted 
by early involvement from the NRA, who in 1988 persuaded some legislators to back a substitute 
amendment that would take away the proposed waiting period.166  They also spent between $1.5 
and $3 million on a media campaign and grassroots efforts to foment public dissatisfaction about 
the bill’s proposed measures.167  The introduction of the substitute amendment divided the House 
on the measure and effectively killed the bill.168  The matter was not taken up again until 1990, 
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and was carried through endless setbacks and policy changes with the “tireless” lobbying efforts 
of the Brady Campaign until the bill’s passage in 1993.169 
Their next goal was Brady II, whose original policy goal was in line with the gun control 
regulations of European nations and would have required a national license for possessing a 
handgun, registration of all firearms, an $800 increase in the cost of a gun license, and licensing 
for all ammunition dealers.170  The NRA’s influence over the 1994 midterm elections and the 
subsequent Republican sweep doomed any prospects of Brady II’s passage.171  Later legislative 
victories on the federal level included the addition of those convicted of domestic abuse to the 
1997 Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, which, in part, enumerates who is ineligible to 
purchase firearms.172   
On the federal level, the Brady Campaign’s success seems to have stalled in the late 
1990s.  Wilson notes that “there have been no national legislative victories in recent years” for 
the organization.173  As Congress has become more partisan and individual members more 
committed to hardline positions on either gun rights or gun control, it has been more difficult for 
the Brady Campaign to persuade legislators on the federal level to reach the kind of compromise 
it took to pass the Brady Law, as long and contentious as that process was.  
 Apart from the difficulty inherent in persuading the two political parties to collaborate on 
federal legislation, the Brady Campaign also has had to address infighting and the lack of a 
coherent message among gun-control groups.  The Brady Campaign has always been the most 
moderate of the prominent gun-control groups, which probably explains its position of 
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dominance among them.  In an article published in the Atlantic discussing the changing tactics of 
gun-control groups, Molly Ball writes that “the various advocacy groups were often more 
concerned with fighting with each other than with taking the fight to their opponents, and a vocal 
contingent valued ideological purity over pragmatism.”174  Infighting about policy goals and 
whether or not to support middle-of-the-road policy measures regarding guns cost these groups 
valuable time in the wake of the Columbine High School shooting in 1999, when President 
Clinton proposed several broad gun control policy measures, and in 2004, when the Federal 
Assault Weapons ban entered its sunset period, which was ultimately not renewed due to a lack 
of Congressional support.175  Ball and others see the potential for success for the Brady 
Campaign and other groups in the future as they continue to adopt a more centrist, incremental 
view of what gun policy should look like, focusing on increased safety measures and less on 
absolutist positions, such as outright bans on certain types of firearms.176 
Other Prominent Groups 
Three other prominent gun-control groups that operate with a goal to impact policy on the 
federal level are the Violence Policy Center, the Coalition to Stop Gun Violence, and the Million 
Mom March (which has been part of the Brady Campaign since 2001).  The Violence Policy 
Center is primarily a research and advocacy group whose stated mission is to “fight firearms 
violence through research, education, and advocacy.”177  They produce up to twenty studies 
annually and are often used by the media as a resource for gun-related issues.178  The VPC’s 
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policy goal is to prohibit private handgun ownership in the U.S., a policy stance that is regarded 
as more militant than that of the Brady Campaign.179 
The Coalition to Stop Gun Violence was formed by the United Methodist General Board 
of Church and Society as an umbrella organization to unite church groups in a mission to ban all 
private ownership of handguns.  It is described as the “second most influential group in the gun 
control movement.”180  Today, the American Psychiatric Association, Americans for Democratic 
Action, and the YWCA are among its other member organizations, and they have over one 
hundred thousand individual members as well.181  All the individual organizations work together 
under the umbrella organization with a goal to reduce gun violence by “eliminating various types 
of firearms.”182  They collaborate with the VPC to disseminate its research, because the two 
organizations share the same policy goal, and also independently lead grassroots activism, voter 
turnout initiatives, and litigation support.183   
The Million Mom March was founded in 1999 so that individuals could unite around one 
event: a gathering on the National Mall in Washington, D.C. to protest the dearth of gun control 
legislation.184  Ultimately, 750,000 people assembled for the event, which inspired similar events 
on a smaller scale nationwide.185  Their resounding initial success prompted the organization to 
create offices in 46 states, but the momentum was astonishingly short-lived.  Within a year, 
many of the offices closed, the national organization laid off all but five of its employees, and it 
attracted far fewer marchers for its anniversary event the following year.186  Kristin Goss 
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correlates their short period of success to a lack of Congressional action attributable to the 
Million Mom March’s efforts, writing that, although the organization’s demands were “modest 
measures, such as expanding background check requirements to private sales at gun shows and 
limiting handgun purchases to one per month,” these demands were ignored in Congress that 
year.187  Congress eventually “…adjourned without having passed any new gun laws.”188  
Although “many observers saw the March as yet another fleeting outburst of pro-control 
sentiment that was doomed by election-year politics,”189 their efforts were incredibly valuable to 
the Brady Campaign, which merged with them in 2001.190  The state-wide chapters established 
under the Million Mom March meant that the Brady Campaign benefited from their established 
grassroots base, allowing them to increase their advocacy efforts to state and local levels.191 
“Common-Sense Gun Laws”: The New Gun-Control Groups 
 Two gun-control groups have recently been founded within a new model where they seek 
a broad base of supporters, including demographics who are not usually advocates for gun 
control, in order to pass “common-sense” gun control laws.  The kind of gun control measures 
that are considered “common-sense” generally attract the highest levels of support in public 
opinion polls and are, for the most part, uncontroversial.   Both Everytown for Gun Safety and 
Americans for Responsible Solutions favor extending criminal background checks to internet 
and gun show sales and prohibiting convicted stalkers and domestic abusers who are in dating 
relationships from purchasing firearms. 
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 Everytown for Gun Safety was formed in 2014 by Michael Bloomberg, a former mayor 
of New York City, who wanted to commit some of his personal wealth to preventing gun 
violence and stimulating policy action on the issue.192 He donated $30 million to start the 
organization, which conducts research on gun violence and possible policy solutions, files 
amicus briefs in court cases where gun laws are imperiled, and contributes funding to candidates 
on the federal, state, and local levels who align with the organization’s policy goals.193   
Gabrielle Giffords, an Arizona congresswoman who was shot in the head and critically 
injured in 2011, formed a super PAC of her own, called Americans for Responsible Solutions, 
with a goal to influence elections and lobby in favor of stricter national gun laws.194  Americans 
for Responsible Solutions lobbies on the state and federal level and has run attack ads against 
senators who voted against the Manchin-Toomey bill, which would have tightened background 
check regulations.195 Ms. Giffords and her husband, Mark Kelly, emphasize their own status as 
“gun owners and strong supporters of the Second Amendment…[who] know we must protect the 
rights of Americans to own guns for collection, recreation, and protection.”196   
Gun Rights  
The NRA is the largest, oldest, and most visible of the pro-gun-rights groups in the 
United States, but there are several other noteworthy organizations with a similar mission.  
Although they are less prominent, they still “…fill niches that the large organization [the NRA] 
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does not and sometimes serve as a burr in its saddle.”197  These include Gun Owners of America, 
which “…calls itself the “no compromise gun lobby,” a not-so-subtle dig at the NRA, and 
manages to make a lot of noise in lawmakers’ offices when gun control legislation is on the 
agenda,”198  The National Association for Gun Rights, whose goal is to “assist the growing 
movement of state-level grassroots gun rights organizations,” and the Citizens Committee for the 
Right to Keep and Bear Arms.199  
Gun Owners of America, like the NRA, has both a research component to the group, 
called the Gun Owners Foundation, and an advocacy arm, the Gun Owners of America Political 
Victory Fund, which creates and disseminates newsletters, email updates, and a candidate rating 
guide for constituents.200  Like the NRA, members pay dues, which help to fund the 
organization’s political efforts.201  Harry L. Wilson describes the membership of Gun Owners of 
America as “more militant” than even the NRA.  The effect of their public suggestion that the 
NRA is willing to compromise on gun policy issues is often enough of a push for the NRA to 
seek a hardline approach.202  In one instance, the NRA originally appeared slated for compromise 
during a 2004 Senate debate regarding limiting liability for gun manufacturers.  Gun Owners of 
America responded by writing on their website that the NRA might concede to amendments to 
legislation that would revive the federal Assault Weapons Ban or close the gun show loophole 
that exempts buyers from background checks in the future.203  The result, as Wilson reports, was 
that the NRA decided to “immediately stake out a no-compromise position on the bill.”204  
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The Citizens Committee for the Right to Keep and Bear Arms is a nonprofit lobbying and 
grassroots organization that aims to promote gun rights-friendly policy through extensive 
lobbying.205  Common among all three organizations is their stance that the NRA compromises 
too often and needs to take a more hardline stance on gun rights over gun control measures.206 
Gun Rights Groups: The NRA 
The NRA has been a key player in the federal gun control policy debate and is the 
leading gun rights proponent of record, both in the United States and, increasingly, 
internationally.207  Spitzer asserts that the organization has “…dominated and defined gun 
politics for most of the last century.”208  The NRA was founded in 1871 to facilitate the 
“improvement of its members in marksmanship.”209  Its entanglement with the federal 
government did not begin to reach its present form until the 1960s, when substantive gun control 
policy reached Congress.210  At that point, Spitzer writes, “…the NRA devoted increasing time 
and resources to the political agenda.”211   
Regarding the NRA’s legislative involvement and lobbying efforts specifically, the group 
tested the waters in the late 1960s and early 1970s by focusing on efforts to defeat gun-control 
proponents who were running for Senate seats.212  They helped to defeat Joseph Clark, a 
Democratic candidate from Pennsylvania, in 1968 and Joseph Tydings, a Democratic candidate 
from Maryland, in 1970.213   The NRA focused on Joseph Clark’s reelection in 1968 because “he 
endorsed strong gun registration laws” and was running in Pennsylvania, a state with a large 
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number of licensed hunters and a significant percentage of its population concentrated in rural 
areas.214 The NRA used scare tactics to spread dislike of Mr. Clark in rural, pro-gun territory, 
which turned into votes for Clark’s opponent.  “In rural Pennsylvania, literature was distributed 
to hunters and farmers solemnly warning that “Clark wants to take away your guns.”215  
 Joseph Tydings’ campaign was effectively smeared by the NRA through its printing and 
mass distribution of bumper stickers that read “if Tydings wins, you lose.”216  The NRA targeted 
their efforts to Maryland’s hunters as they did two years earlier in Pennsylvania, saying that a 
bill that Tydings had proposed, the Firearms Registration and Licensing Act, would prevent them 
from using their guns for sporting purposes.217  He was defeated by a Republican candidate, 
Glenn Beall Jr.218  Mr. Tydings acknowledged the power of the NRA and their ability to 
fundraise and mobilize: “they raised money all over the nation to bring to Maryland to beat me.  
And bragged about it.”219 
After these two victories, the NRA was convinced that legislative involvement was both 
effective and necessary. The NRA expanded their efforts further by creating their lobbying 
organization, the Institute for Legislative Action, in 1975.220  Cook and Goss report that the 
Institute operated with a budget of $230 million in 2011; their Political Action Committee, the 
NRA Political Victory Fund, spent approximately $16 million during the 2012 election cycle.221 
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Vizzard acknowledges that the NRA’s influence extends past its lobbying efforts. 
Although the organization’s ability to and prowess at lobbying Congress and its members is 
incredibly important to the efficacy of their work, it cannot be ignored that “the NRA and its 
allies have exercised as much control over public policy by molding public attitudes, language, 
and cultural paradigms as by direct influence in Congress.”222 
III. Why is the NRA so Effective? 
The effectiveness of the gun lobby, particularly the NRA, is well known.  They are 
consistently recognized as one of the most powerful interest groups in Washington.223  The 
organization is notable for their successful lobbying record.  The NRA has not “…lost a major 
battle over federal gun control legislation in nearly two decades.”224  Their public approval 
ratings are high, even after a mass shooting occurs.  Immediately after the Sandy Hook school 
shooting in December 2012, only thirty-three percent of Americans expressed the belief that the 
NRA had too much control over gun laws.225  What factors contribute to their power and 
influence?   
Issue Framing 
 Deborah Stone describes the paradox present in the debate about gun rights versus gun 
control: “Policy on guns is pulled between these two strong ideas: guns are vital to personal 
safety and a threat to public safety.  Policy makers must balance conflicting imperatives. ”226 
Gun rights activists view it as a rights issue: 
For gun rights supporters, guns are “a necessary tool to the human right of self-
defense.”  They are also part of America’s cultural heritage, “symbols of 
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citizenship, intimately tied to defending political rights.”  Colonists armed 
themselves against Native Americans and the British and, thanks to guns, survived 
and won their independence.  The right to own and use guns is “at the center of the 
Western liberal tradition, a right without which all other rights and obligations are 
meaningless and impossible.”227 
 
 In this view, guns are enmeshed in the most heroic and inspiring moment of American 
history, its fight for independence from Britain, and in the natural rights possessed by all within 
the “Western liberal tradition.”  Gun ownership is framed not only as a patriotic, American value 
but an inalienable right that, if taken away, shakes the foundation of the rights of citizens living 
in a democracy.   
By contrast, gun control advocates frame guns in a far more threatening, dangerous light.  
Stone provides an overview of issue-framing in the pro-gun-control context: 
For gun control advocates, guns kill and injure. They are the weapon of choice in 
crime and are more likely to result in death than any other weapon. And although 
guns can be used for self-defense, they can also be used for suicide…Guns kept in 
the home for self-defense can fall into children’s hands, leading to accidental deaths 
and injuries. They can also fall into burglars’ hands and become weapons of 
crime…For gun control supporters, then, the potential benefits of self-defense are 
outweighed by the costs of increased violence and insecurity.228 
 
When examining the two potential ways of framing this issue, it is important to note one 
of the key advantages that gun rights groups use in this debate and in their issue-framing 
strategies: a constitutional amendment.  They are able to frame any and all attempts to institute 
gun control measures as an infringement upon the Second Amendment, a right that they interpret 
to mean that all American citizens have an absolute right to bear any kind of arms in nearly any 
circumstance.  Their consistent narrative involves positioning themselves as the defenders of 
Americans’ right to bear arms, a right that is constantly under attack by gun control advocates 
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and the federal government.  The NRA’s “about” page on their website repeatedly refers to the 
organization’s defense of the Second Amendment against government infringement.  For 
example, the page describes the creation of the Institute for Legislative Action, its lobbying arm, 
as follows: 
In response to repeated attacks on the Second Amendment right, NRA formed the 
Legislative Affairs Division in 1934. While NRA did not lobby directly at this time, 
it did mail out legislative facts and analyses to members, whereby they could take 
action on their own.  In 1975, recognizing the critical need for political defense of 
the Second Amendment, NRA formed the Institute for Legislative Action, or 
ILA.229 
  
Every action they take is framed as fighting back against an invasive federal government 
whose ultimate goal is to take away the firearms that the American people have a constitutional 
right to possess and use.  They are self-described as “a major political force and as America’s 
foremost defender of Second Amendment rights.”230   
In a similar vein, the NRA’s page that details the work of its Political Victory Fund 
explains the driving force behind the organization as a whole: “NRA relies on a very simple 
premise: when provided with the facts, the nation’s elected officials will recognize that “gun 
control” schemes are an infringement on the Second Amendment and a proven failure in fighting 
crime.”231  These two statements of self-described organizational goals show that the NRA views 
itself as an organization that understands the correct interpretation of the Second Amendment 
and must educate the public and lawmakers about it in order to protect the integrity of people’s 
Second Amendment rights. 
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 Deborah Stone also writes about negative and positive liberty, a key difference that she 
highlights between perceptions of liberty between conservatives and liberals. It seems applicable 
to the gun control debate and ideological differences between gun rights proponents and gun 
control proponents.  Negative liberty, a concept articulated by the philosopher Isaiah Berlin and 
discussed in Stone, is the principle that “I am…free to the degree to which no man or body of 
men interferes with my activity.  Political liberty…is simply the area within which a man can act 
unobstructed by others…”232  Stone writes that conservatives “…look for instances of somebody 
taking someone else’s resources.”233  When they are able to frame an issue that “suggests a 
negative concept of liberty and conjures up the old colonial fear of tyrannical government,”234 
citizens worry that their rights will be taken away. 
 Gun ownership as a fundamental expression of liberty and as a natural right of American 
citizens has been consistently employed as part of the narrative of the NRA and other gun-rights 
groups.  Writing for PBS NewsHour about the power of language and issue-framing in the gun-
rights versus gun-control debate, Simone Pathe notes that the NRA “…uses the rhetoric of rights 
to lend legitimacy to its argument.”235  When the NRA’s CEO and Executive Vice President, 
Wayne LaPierre, testified in front of Congress in January 2013, he called gun ownership a “God-
given, fundamental right.”236  Referring to the language used in organization-wide, internal 
polling of NRA members, Andrew Arulanandam, a spokesperson for the organization, said that 
“for us, it’s a debate over gun rights.”237 
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The NRA and other gun-rights groups have consistently conflated gun control with an 
ever-present threat to people’s rights and liberties.  Writing for the Huffington Post, Dennis 
Henigan, a former Vice President of the Brady Campaign, explains how this argument 
effectively convinces the public that the government taking away people’s guns and their rights 
to own guns is not only in the realm of possibility, but something that could very easily happen 
should gun-rights supporters ever let their guard down in the face of proposed gun control 
measures: 
For the NRA, the key to this strategy is the “slippery slope” argument—that every 
incremental tightening of gun laws is but a step down the slippery slope to a general 
gun ban.  Some years ago, the NRA’s Wayne LaPierre described “the plan” which 
is “now obvious to all who would see: first, step, enact a nationwide firearms 
waiting period law.  Second step, when the waiting period doesn’t reduce crime, 
and it won’t, enact a nationwide registration law.  Final step, confiscate all the 
registered firearms.”  In the words of another NRA official, “what the opposition 
really wants is a total ban on the private ownership of all firearms.”238 
 
When language like this is employed, gun-rights supporters remain in constant fear that their 
guns will be taken away and will naturally want to resist this.  Alarmist language, as employed 
by Mr. LaPierre and other NRA spokespeople, spurs the organization’s membership into action. 
In communicating this message, the NRA has the advantage of preaching to the 
converted, in a sense.  Their millions of members are the primary targets for the NRA’s 
messages and communications.  Gun-control advocates have to do more to sway public opinion 
and do not have the advantage of communicating to a large, organized group that is already in 
favor of its message.239  The NRA has been able to use negative media coverage of gun violence 
to its advantage, framing the issue in a way that turns what could otherwise paint the NRA’s 
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mission in a negative light into instances that galvanize the NRA membership into action that 
will support gun rights.  Brian Anse Patrick, writing about the NRA’s effective reshaping of 
negative media coverage into a call to action for its membership, says: 
The NRA decodes media content for its members along lines characteristic of social 
movement mobilization, e.g., allusions to class or cultural media war against gun 
owners.  This suggests an awareness on the part of the NRA of the manifold benefits 
of interpreting coverage for its members: negative coverage successfully 
reinterpreted is coverage that mobilizes and reinforces solidarity, a sort of reverse 
or co-opted form of publicity worth millions measured either in dollars or 
members.240 
 
The sense that their lifestyle is under attack and that it is necessary for the group to stand 
in solidarity under this attack, coupled with a belief in the validity of their stance on the Second 
Amendment, only strengthens the group.241 
Gun Control Groups and Issue Framing 
Positive liberty, a contrasting view, requires that “I wish…to be moved by reasons, by 
conscious purposes, which are my own…[to be] self-directed and not [treated as] a thing, or an 
animal, or a slave…incapable…of conceiving goals and policies of my own and realizing 
them.”242  Liberals “…look for evidence of severe deprivations that would prevent people from 
“conceiving goals and realizing them,” in Berlin’s words.”243  This kind of liberty is difficult to 
frame in the context of the gun control debate.  The “severe deprivations” that Berlin says are 
key motivators for liberals to call for change certainly exist in the form of loss of life due to gun 
violence.  However, the guiding principle of being “self directed” and not being treated as 
someone “…incapable…of conceiving goals and policies of my own and realizing them” is an 
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argument that pro-gun-rights advocates use in their own issue-framing.  The liberty/freedom 
narrative on the pro-gun-control side in this instance is not as compelling.   
The dominant imagery that gun-control groups often rally around are tragic incidents of 
gun violence.  These are powerful images, and the public often reacts early on with support for 
stricter gun control measures, but these instances of public solidarity with the gun control 
movement are fleeting.  Luke Chitwood describes the drawbacks to using these images: 
Gun-control advocates push for negatively framed aims like fewer deaths, fewer 
injuries, less violence…It’s a downer message missing a clear hope of meaningful 
change.  Each widely publicized shooting is more heart-wrenching, terrible, and 
puzzling than the last.  But the pain from these horrific events numbs or fades 
quickly, and with that emotional detachment goes the response.  Those events are 
not movement-sustaining or galvanizing in an enduring way.244 
 
A negative frame of the issues characterized by a situational reaction to tragedies as they 
occur does not have the same consistency of message as the NRA’s dominant issue frame, which 
is based around Second-Amendment rights. 
In the past, gun control groups have suffered in popularity and credibility because of 
messaging and image framing that disputes much of what the NRA and other gun-rights groups 
claim to be true.  In the words of Molly Ball, writing for the Atlantic, “they openly disputed that 
the Second Amendment conferred the right to own a gun.  Their major policy goals were to make 
handguns illegal and to enroll all U.S. gun owners in a federal database.”245  This stance is 
absolutist and unappealing.  Gun control organizations’ policy goals were framed in a way that 
seemed to want to take rights away from people, making them far less appealing than the NRA’s 
framing of the issue, which seeks to, in their view, protect a natural right that is enshrined in the 
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Constitution and extended to all Americans.  By previously framing their views in a way that 
dismissed an individual rights interpretation of the Second Amendment, “…gun control 
advocates were putting up “a stone wall, a barrier to gun owners” that made them “logically 
presume that you wanted to take their gun away.”246 
In recent years, gun control groups have framed the issue in a way that emphasizes gun 
violence prevention, instead of gun control, as their principal policy goal.247  Their mission is to 
express themselves in a way that is “…more appealing to Middle America and moderate 
voters.”248  Dan Gross, the president of the Brady Campaign, explains the new strategy taken by 
gun-control groups in recent years: “the message is now turned outward instead of inward, 
focused on engaging and mobilizing the latent majority of the public that supports common-
sense measures like universal background checks.”249  The Brady Campaign and other groups are 
taking a more moderate stance on policy goals, hoping to attract people who might not believe in 
the more stringent gun control measures that groups had advocated for in the past.   
They are also choosing to emphasize the risks inherent in improper storage of firearms, 
like accidental shootings of and by children, and suicide, particularly among adolescents who are 
able to access guns owned by their parents.  It is notable that both the Brady Campaign and 
Everytown for Gun Safety have made guns in the home and awareness of the impact of gun 
violence on children into two of their main policy priorities.250  On its website, Everytown for 
Gun Safety explains that “it’s easy to believe that your guns are well hidden or that your children 
know how to stay away…” and urges its readers to “…start an honest conversation about what 
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responsible gun ownership means, and we should develop technology and laws that make safe 
storage the norm.  We can protect our kids while respecting the rights of lawful—and 
responsible—gun owners.”251  With language like this, it is clear that pro-gun-control groups are 
beginning to frame their positions in ways that seek to attract “responsible” gun owners to their 
cause, instead of demonizing all gun owners. Everytown for Gun Safety’s website assumes that 
its readers are, in fact, gun owners who are looking for ways to be responsible about it and 
minimize the risks to their families, a universal concern of all people, regardless of their views 
on guns.  This changed policy position for pro-gun-control groups seeks to include gun owners in 
their advocacy by focusing on issues that all people can be concerned about: the health and 
safety of their loved ones. 
Membership Recruitment and Retention 
According to Cook and Goss, the principal source of the NRA’s influence is “…its 
committed membership of somewhere around 3.4 million members.”252  Although citizens would 
not be as effective acting on their own, they are able to join the NRA, which is perfectly adapted 
to game the American political system, which, as Cook and Goss note, has “…many points of 
political access and relatively weak political parties,” allowing the NRA to step in and influence 
the political process.253   The organization has, according to Cook and Goss, “built-in advantages 
that its leaders have leveraged with strategies that are especially well suited to succeeding in 
American politics.”254    
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One of these advantages is the NRA’s organizational structure.  The fact that the NRA 
operates and engages citizens and policymakers on the local, state, and national level means that 
“…it can apply pressure on lawmakers at all three levels of government.”255  Not only does this 
structure guarantee success in all levels of government, it also contributes to the NRA’s ability to 
involve itself in the three branches of government.  Lobbyists weigh in on legislation at the 
federal and state level, lawyers litigate and defend gun rights in court, and NRA lobbyists and 
experts influence regulations that are created in the executive branch.256 
The second factor contributing to their power is the incentives provided to NRA members 
by virtue of their membership in the organization.257  Not only does it offer its members 
“…tangible things of value that people will join the organization just to receive-in the NRA’s 
case, items such as magazines with useful information, discounts on everything from hotels to 
hearing aids, even a wine club membership,”  but it also provides them with experiences that 
reinforce their feelings of solidarity with the mission of the organization and its other members, 
like shooting events and competitions.258 
The third factor contributing to the NRA’s influence is the “…sense of meaning and 
satisfaction we get when we work for a cause we hold dear” that it provides to its members.259  
The NRA has imbued gun ownership and culture with meaning by affiliating it with national 
values, supporting the NRA’s claim that “guns contribute to the public good.”260 
Although Spitzer notes the relative ineffectiveness of grassroots engagement on social 
regulatory policy, the NRA has transcended the difficulty of organizing effective grassroots 
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engagement.  They have been able to generate genuine, effective grassroots engagement among 
their many members, who “…show up at lawmakers’ town hall meetings, contact elected 
officials, write letters to the editor, harass opponents, and cast their votes based on a candidate’s 
gun rights positions.”261  Polls taken in 1978 and in 2013 support the assertion that supporters of 
gun rights are more likely to engage in supportive action over their stance on the issue than are 
gun-control supporters.  The 1978 poll, administered by Howard Schuman and Stanley Presser, 
found that supporters of gun rights were 
 …three times as likely to have taken some action on the issue, such as writing a 
letter or giving money.  Even when correcting for the fact that there were more pro-
control supporters, nearly two-thirds of all letter writers and donors were from the 
pro-gun rights side.262  
 
Self-Reported Behavior on the Gun Permit Issue: 
August 1978263 
Behavior 
Reported 
Position on Gun Permits 
 Pro-permit Anti-permit 
Written a 
Letter 
3.7 6.5 
Given Money 1.7 7.7 
Written a 
Letter and 
Given Money 
1.7 6.2 
Neither 92.9 79.6 
Total 100 100 
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Although it is clear from the polling data that most people on both sides of the gun permit 
issue chose to do nothing to support their views externally, the percentage of those who took 
action on the anti-permit side of the issue is substantially higher than those who were in favor of 
the proposed permit.  It shows that if even such a small percentage of people choose to act, they 
can still have an impact, especially when the opposite viewpoint is expressed less frequently. The 
2013 poll found that gun-rights supporters were twice as likely to have “…given money, 
contacted a public official, expressed an opinion on a social networking site, or signed a petition 
on the gun issue.”264   
The Policy Advantage of the NRA Over Gun Control Groups 
Cook and Goss find two policy norms that advantage gun-rights advocates over gun control 
advocates. These result from the fact that  
…in a political system with many choke points, it’s easier to block a proposal than 
it is to push something through… [and]…people respond more vigorously to threats 
of loss than they do to the prospect of gains, particularly if those gains are 
theoretical or off in the future.265 
 
The pro-gun lobby has managed to capitalize effectively on these two natural advantages by 
not only blocking new legislation that it dislikes, but by also advancing an affirmative strategy to 
“enact new laws relaxing the old ones.”266  In this way, they are not simply keeping the status 
quo on gun control legislation.   They are able to advance their agenda to create policy that is 
shaped by their own values. 
One example where this proactive strategy was put into practice on the federal level is the 
Firearms Owners Protection Act of 1986, also known as the McLure-Volkmer Bill.267  William J. 
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Vizzard refers to it as “the centerpiece of NRA strategy,” crafted by Neal Knox and Harlon 
Carter, two NRA leaders in the early 1980s.268  The legislative goal for the NRA was to repeal 
the 1968 Gun Control Act.269  While it did not achieve its ultimate goal, it substantially 
weakened the provisions of the Gun Control Act.270   Its consequences included the 
reintroduction of interstate sales of rifles and shotguns “as long as the sale was legal in the state 
of the buyer and the seller,” elimination of record-keeping requirements for ammunition dealers, 
relaxed licensing regulations for gun sellers unless they sold firearms “regularly,” and 
“prohibited the establishment of any system of comprehensive firearms registration,” which had 
originally been one of the goals of the 1968 Gun Control Act.271 Regarding the House debate on 
the bill, a reporter for the New York Times observed that “…It was a measure of the power of the 
gun lobby that no member of Congress, in the day-long debate, spoke in favor of keeping all the 
existing controls.  Rather, the question was the extent to which they should be eased.”272  
Overall, the Firearms Owners Protection Act “…allowed a major reversal in the trend toward 
stricter firearm regulation.”273  
A more recent example is NRA involvement in healthcare legislation, particularly the 
Affordable Care Act.  After the NRA successfully lobbied at the state level in Florida to penalize 
doctors if they asked their patients about gun ownership, a provision that became state law in 
2012, they ensured that a similar provision was passed on the federal level in 2013.274  Title X of 
the Affordable Care Act includes a section titled “Protection of Second Amendment Gun 
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Rights.”275  Its measures require that health care providers not “collect data related to owning or 
using firearms,” “not require the disclosure or collection of information relating to the presence 
or storage of a lawfully possessed firearm or the use of a firearm,” and that individuals “do not 
have to disclose that they own a gun.”276  These efforts were largely interpreted as an effort to 
disrupt the view of gun use and gun violence as a public health issue.  The NRA has also lobbied 
to block federal funding for research into firearms by the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention.277 
While the pro-gun lobby benefits from these policy norms, gun-control groups face the 
difficulties inherent in fighting against these norms.  While the gun lobby simply has to strike 
down legislation it does not like, gun-control advocates have to come together to create a policy 
that they all agree on.  This can be difficult when the most prominent organizations do not 
always agree.  As has been shown, their policy objectives are all slightly different.278  Cook and 
Goss observe that, like gun control organizations, the general public does not agree either on 
how to best bring about gun control.279 Only recently has a consensus begun to emerge that 
background checks must be expanded to most or all gun sales.280 
One major challenge for gun-control activists is that they are working to bring about a 
public good: a society free of gun violence.  The free-rider problem is inherent in working 
towards a public good. “Because people benefit from a public good whether or not they helped to 
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achieve it, they have a tendency to withhold their time and money and “free ride” on the 
contributions of others.”281  Unlike an NRA membership, joining a gun control organization has 
no real tangible benefits.   
Another unique challenge that the gun control movement faces in contrast to the gun-
rights movement is its constituency.  Cook and Goss note that advocates and supporters are often 
victims or are disadvantaged and lacking in political capital.282  In other words, 
many survivors and family members live in low income communities and lack time, 
money, and powerful networks that are used in network building; many would-be 
advocates also are depleted by their experience.283   
 
The NRA does not face these same disadvantages in its constituency.   
In recent years, more gun control groups are beginning to bring in elected officials and 
other high-profile individuals, similar to what the NRA does.  Gabrielle Giffords, who now leads 
Americans for Responsible Solutions, is a former Congresswoman from Arizona who was shot 
during an open forum for her constituents.  Michael Bloomberg, who founded Everytown for 
Gun Safety, is the former mayor of New York City.  He, along with Thomas Menino, the former 
long-serving mayor of Boston, came together to create Mayors Against Illegal Guns in 2006.284  
The group’s members now include “more than 1,000 current and former mayors…[who] fight 
for common-sense gun laws.”285  The fact that more gun-control groups are either led by or 
affiliated with powerful individuals increases their profile and the publicity awarded to them. 
 Apart from policy norms, the NRA’s strength in comparison to the Brady Campaign and 
other gun-control groups also comes from other sources.  One of them is financial.  Part of the 
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NRA’s operating budget is made up of membership dues.  Its approximately 3.5 million 
members means that the money adds up significantly.  None of the prominent gun-control 
organizations require membership fees.  Instead, they rely on voluntary donations.286  This means 
that the NRA can outspend the gun control organizations in lobbying and campaign 
contributions.  This level of spending leads to “access to decision makers, and access is half of 
the battle.”287 Cook and Goss report that “the combined membership of state and national gun 
control groups in the early 2000s was about 7% of that of the NRA,” as were the Brady 
Campaign and the National Coalition to Prevent Gun Violence’s combined revenues.288  
Americans for Responsible Solutions and Everytown for Gun Safety’s most recent expense 
reports show that their overall revenues total $8,168,577 (in 2016)  and $36,030,037 (in 2013), 
respectively.289  The NRA’s annual operating budget in 2015 was “…some quarter of a billion 
dollars,” and their annual lobbying budget in 2015 was approximately $3 million, according to 
James Surowiecki of the New Yorker.290 
Because of these factors, which attract a high volume of loyal, dues-paying members that 
all believe in the organization’s ethos, money, and influence drawn from the NRA’s 
membership, its political strength is reinforced by programs that they are able to support 
precisely because of their membership.  These programs include “…developing and 
disseminating authoritative research and talking points for lawmakers, orchestrating grassroots 
and inside-the-beltway lobbying, communicating with members, and influencing elections.”291 
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Gun-control groups are fighting back and have begun in recent years to adapt some of the 
gun lobby’s tactics.  One of those tactics is to focus on elections in order to defeat NRA-friendly 
candidates.292  In one instance, former Mayor of New York City Michael Bloomberg’s Super 
PAC, Independence USA, donated more than $2 million to Congresswoman Robin Kelly, an 
underdog congressional candidate from Illinois during the 2013 election, contributing to her 
victory.293  Independence USA used attack ads and direct mailings against Ms. Kelly’s opponent, 
Debbie Halvorson, who was running as an incumbent.294 These were similar to efforts that the 
NRA employed against Democratic, pro-gun-control candidates in the late 1960s and early 
1970s.295  Halvorson had held an “A” rating from the NRA during her time in Congress.296  
Although Halvorson initially led the race, with a 51 percent favorability rating according to an 
internal poll, Kelly won with 52 percent of the vote to Halvorson’s 25 percent.297  Doug Schoen, 
an Independence USA staffer who helped to lead campaign efforts for Robin Kelly, 
acknowledged that “…this was a concerted, focused campaign solely on the gun issue…There 
were no other issues and themes used.  This election became…a referendum on guns—that was 
our avowed purpose, that was our intent and what we were seeking.”298  Notably, the NRA did 
not contribute to Halvorson’s campaign.299 
The other tactic that gun control organizations are using to great effect is to “…engage 
family members and survivors of gun violence as full-time lobbyists, media spokespeople, and 
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grassroots advocates.”300  Although they had previously been used effectively to promote gun 
control on the state and local level, it has only been recently that some have ascended to the 
national stage.  Cook and Goss note that “the Virginia Tech families were key to passage of the 
2007 federal legislation to improve the national background check system…”301  Fifteen family 
members and survivors of the Virginia Tech shooting testified in front of the Senate in 2008 in 
favor of the National Instant Criminal Background Check Improvement Act of 2007.302  Key 
provisions of the bill required states to submit records of people who were determined to be 
ineligible to buy firearms to the NICS and penalize states that did not comply with an additional 
requirement to automate and transfer their records to the NICS.303  Many of the family members’ 
testimony focused on the fact that the shooter had been determined mentally ill and dangerous by 
Virginia courts, which meant that he was technically prohibited from buying weapons, but his 
access to firearms remained unimpeded due to weak points in the background check system.304  
A strengthened background check system where states complied with reporting to NICS about 
dangerous individuals would help to avoid consequences like those of the Virginia Tech 
shooting.305   
As the legislative process on this particular bill dragged on for years, they continued to 
testify and give public statements in the aftermath of similar events, including after the shooting 
of Congresswoman Gabrielle Giffords in 2011 in Tucson, Arizona, where the shooter was also 
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mentally ill but allowed to purchase firearms anyway.306  The National Instant Criminal 
Background Check Improvement Act of 2007 passed in May 2011.307  Paul Helmke, a professor 
of Indiana University’s School of Public and Environmental Affairs, in an article for the 
Huffington Post, wrote that “survivors and family members of the Virginia Tech massacre fought 
to make the Brady background check better, and their efforts have been vindicated by the bill’s 
passage.”308   
Families of the 2012 Sandy Hook shootings have created an advocacy group, Sandy 
Hook Promise, which began its work on the state level, leading efforts to create  stronger gun 
safety laws in Connecticut.309  They went to Washington to lobby members of Congress to get 
them to support the Manchin-Toomey bill, which would have further strengthened background 
checks and closed the gun show loophole.  In spite of their efforts, a 2013 bipartisan compromise 
to require background checks for all commercial gun purchases was defeated.310  After the San 
Bernardino shootings in December 2015, the Manchin-Toomey bill was put to a vote in the 
Senate and failed again, 50 to 48.311  Even though results have been mixed, as these cases show, 
testimony from survivors and families of victims is compelling and puts a human face to a 
politicized issue.  Matt Bennett, a policy advisor at Third Way, a policy research institute, wrote 
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in an essay for the Brookings Institution about the impact of the Sandy Hook victims’ families on 
gun control, that: 
It’s often the case that some of the most effective advocates in American politics 
are people who have a personal stake in an issue…But it is a rare thing for such 
advocates to be granted time with almost any senator they ask to meet—rarer still 
for them to be able to move even the most jaded of these lawmakers to tears by 
bringing out a photo of a smiling six-year-old child.  Yet that keeps happening with 
Sandy Hook families…But these families don’t want sympathy—they want a bill 
signed into law..312 
 
IV.  Where Does Gun Control Policy Gridlock Come from? 
 William J. Vizzard argues that the national debate over federal gun control policy has, 
time and time again, created 
…a political environment skewed in favor of individualism, incrementalism, and 
pluralism has produced a form of stalemate…that shifts attention from crafting 
functional policy to efforts at controlling language and paradigms.  The result is 
poorly crafted and ineffectual policy, the implementation of which accomplishes 
little except generating conflict that feeds back into the policy debate.313 
 
 Spitzer notes the repeated reaction during each national moment of gun control 
controversy:  
The political pattern typifying the gun debate is one in which repetitive political 
scenarios play themselves out with great fury but astonishingly little effect.  The 
cycle of outrage, action, and reaction usually begins with the sensational and the 
horrific.314 
 
This pattern can be easily observed in each of the three cases from the previous chapter.  
Reacting to the 1968 assassinations of Martin Luther King, Jr. and Robert F. Kennedy (outrage), 
supporters of gun control measures finally had the upper hand over its opponents and were able 
to pass the Gun Control Act of 1968 (action), a measure that had been introduced by President 
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Lyndon B. Johnson every year since 1965.315  After the passage of the Gun Control Act of 1968, 
implementation of the newest policy “overshadowed” formulation of new policy, according to 
Vizzard.316  Encouraged by the new legislation, gun control advocacy groups were formally 
created and organized beginning in the late 1960s and the early 1970s.317  Their effect on gun-
rights advocates was to “…energize [gun-rights proponents] into more intense resistance.”318 
Vizzard reports that “there is substantial evidence that a sudden increase in visible public 
support for gun control had a significant impact on the bill’s passage.”319  The NRA and other 
organized gun control opponents set out on a mission to weaken the legislation’s provisions and 
were ultimately successful.  In 1969, a measure that required sellers of ammunition to register 
their purchasers was repealed, largely due to the machinations of the NRA and the gun lobby.320  
Because of the efforts of the NRA and other pro-gun rights lobbying organizations, “…the law 
still proved to be more of a statement of intended policy than a framework for policy 
implementation.”321 Spitzer writes that the vigorous efforts of the NRA and its affiliates were 
 …mostly successful in blocking gun control measures in the states and at the 
federal level in the 1970s and 1980s, but toward the end of the 1980s public 
sentiment shifted more strongly toward gun control, and the NRA’s political 
inflexibility and stridency began to make more enemies than friends. As a 
consequence, the political fulcrum began to shift in favor of gun control proponents, 
spearheaded by the Brady Campaign to Prevent Gun Violence.322 
 
This sea change in political positioning on the gun control issue carried the public’s shock 
and concern about James Brady’s devastating injuries during the assassination attempt of then-
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President Ronald Reagan to the halls of Congress (outrage), where it was introduced in its 
original form for the first time in the House in 1987 (action).323  The reaction from the NRA and 
other gun control opponents was fierce in its scope.  They were able to kill the bill in 1988, 
execute a multi-million dollar grassroots and media campaign against the Brady Bill in the 
interim,324 and, when it was reintroduced in 1990, they delayed passage of the bill until May of 
1991 and even proposed an alternate bill in its place.325  They lobbied against the Brady Bill so 
effectively that, even when the bill seemed slated for passage in 1991, Senate Republicans 
filibustered it, requiring the bill’s sponsors to withdraw their support and wait another two years 
to pass it successfully, this time in 1993.326  By this time, the opponents of the bill had so much 
clout that they were able to pass a version of the bill with a five-day waiting period in place for 
only five years, with the National Instant Criminal Background Check System as its subsequent 
replacement.327  
Two years later, the Federal Assault Weapons Ban was passed (action); it was inspired by a 
1989 mass shooting where a mentally ill man killed 5 children and wounded twenty-nine others 
with an AK-47 (outrage).328  The reaction to the Federal Assault Weapons Ban was so 
contentious that it required renegotiation in the wake of opposition from the NRA and its allies, 
who did not support an assault weapons ban in any capacity.329  The Assault Weapons Ban was 
reviled by most Republicans, who made its repeal a legislative priority after they won control of 
the House in 1994.330 This consistent, cyclical pattern evident in the three cases shows how 
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incremental and crisis-based gun control policy has been on a federal level, not exactly a strong 
foundation for policy. 
V. Conclusions 
 Gun control belongs to a uniquely contentious category of policy that is characterized by 
strongly-held convictions and emotions on both sides of the issue.  Its status as social regulatory 
policy, which seeks to restrain or regulate individual conduct, means that the NRA and other gun 
rights groups have an advantage when trying to sway both lawmakers and the general public.  
Because people have a tendency to dislike policy that seeks to regulate their behavior, the pro-
gun-control side of the debate has faced far more difficulty in swaying lawmakers and the public, 
which means that the impetus for federal gun control policy has come from tragic situations 
where public outrage over gun violence is at a sufficiently high level to override concerns of 
governmental restriction of individual rights and behavior.  This outrage-action-reaction cycle 
has led to incremental policy that later faces backlash from gun rights groups and their 
supporters, diminishing the effectiveness of the policy and increasing the level of difficulty that 
gun control advocates face the next time policy regulation on guns is sought on the federal level.  
 These kinds of obstacles, coupled with the public’s dislike of social regulatory policy, is 
manifested in public opinion polling on issues of gun control.  Although public opinion indicates 
that people favor it conceptually, some regulations are met with higher levels of public approval 
than others.  Additionally, the trend shown by public opinion polling on the subject of gun 
control has begun to indicate a long-term shift in public opinion, showing that people are 
beginning to favor gun rights over gun control in a theoretical, binary situation.  This trend and 
the specifics of public opinion polling on this topic will be further discussed in Chapter Three. 
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Chapter 3: Public Opinion and its Role 
	  
In Guns, Gun Control, and Elections: The Politics and Policy of Firearms, published in 
2007, Harry Wilson analyzes the existing literature about gun control and public opinion, finding 
that “many researchers have noted an apparent consensus in favor of the general concept of gun 
control.”331  He quotes Gary Kleck, a gun control scholar and one of Wilson’s contemporaries, 
who concludes that “there are a large number and a wide range of weak-to-moderate regulatory 
controls that solid majorities of Americans will endorse if asked.”332  However, Wilson’s book 
was published nine years ago, and the landscape of public opinion about gun control in America 
has shifted.  The change has not necessarily occurred in the area of regulatory control; according 
to Pew Research Center, as of July 2015 (the most recent poll Pew conducted on the issue), the 
majority of Americans supported several of the most common gun-control proposals, including 
background checks for private sales and gun shows, laws to prevent the mentally ill from buying 
guns, the creation of a federal database to track gun sales, and a ban on assault-style weapons.333  
What has changed is the public’s perception that support for gun rights and support for gun 
control measures are diametrically opposed; that is to say that one may be in favor of either gun 
rights or gun control but it is impossible to be in favor of both.  At several points in the past three 
years, Pew Research Center’s poll found that the majority of the American public favored gun 
rights over gun control, as measured by the question “what do you think is more important—to 
protect the rights of Americans to own guns, OR to control gun ownership?”334   
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This chapter will highlight trends in public opinion regarding gun control policy and the 
theory that could explain the seeming disconnect between what the general public wants in 
federal gun control legislation and what is actually passed in Congress. 
I. What is the Importance of Public Opinion to Gun Control Policy? 
Kleck notes that public opinion is an essential part of the debate surrounding gun control 
policy.  Advocates for both gun rights and gun control rely on public opinion to inform and 
enhance their policy positions.335  Public opinion is also a key element of the legislative process 
for any potential gun control policy decision. As Kleck notes, “for proposed gun controls to have 
any impact, they must survive the political process and be implemented first, and this is harder in 
the face of significant public opposition to the controls.”336   
Paul Burstein observes that there are three general principles in the link between public 
policy and public opinion on which the social science community has reached a consensus: 
“public opinion influences public policy; the more salient an issue to the public, the stronger the 
relationship is likely to be; and the relationship is threatened by the power of interest 
organizations, political parties, and economic elites.”337  However, there is less consensus among 
the academic community about the relative impact of these three factors.338   
The amount of influence held by public opinion and its effect on public policy is 
disputed.  Some theorists assert that there is a high degree of responsiveness of public policy to 
public opinion, particularly when shifts in public opinion occur.339  Others give more emphasis to 
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the power held by interest groups and their role in the legislative process, which can put pressure 
on legislators to contravene public opinion.340  Burstein summarizes the differences of opinion: 
Jones (1994) argues that inherent limitations in both the cognitive capacities of 
individuals and the organizational capacities of Congress mean that responsiveness 
is likely on only the few issues that the public cares about at any given time.  Zaller 
(1992) and others contend that on many issues the public cannot be said to have 
meaningful political opinions, so policy must be the product of other forces.  And 
Arnold (1990: 271-72) suggests that many issues are so complex, and the legislative 
process so arcane, that most citizens are unable to ascertain whether their interests 
are being served.  Thus, predictions about the impact of opinion on policy range 
from its having a very substantial influence (Stimson, MacKuen, and Erikson 1995) 
to its keeping policy, rather vaguely, “in bounds” in its distance from public opinion 
(Jones 1994:238).   
 
Without a consensus, the level of responsiveness of legislators to public opinion is 
unclear.  Burstein used thirty studies about government responsiveness to determine how public 
policy was influenced by public opinion.341  He found that “three-quarters of the relationships 
between opinion and policy are statistically significant,”342 meaning that “…policy is affected by 
opinion most of the time; often—over half the time when public opinion has any effect—the 
impact really matters substantively.”343   
Other theorists emphasize the influence that interest groups, political parties, and elites 
hold over policy.344  This level of influence, coupled with the resources available to them, can 
devalue democratic responsiveness and divert attention from public opinion.345  However 
influential interest groups, political parties, and elites are on policy, their “…political activities 
may be most effective when consistent with public opinion.”346  This means that the actions of 
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these separate entities resonate more when they are in line with what the general public wants 
from gun control policy.  In fact, interest groups might enhance responsiveness of legislators to 
public opinion.  Burstein summarizes Hasen’s 1991 article, which finds that  
…interest groups may be influential, in part, because they provide information 
useful to legislators, including information about what the public wants, serving as 
useful intermediaries between the public and the government.  They represent some 
groups better than others, but overall may enhance the impact of public opinion on 
public policy.347 
 
Another factor in democratic responsiveness is issue salience.  A certain amount of 
salience is required in order to keep the issue on the forefront of the minds of both the public and 
elected officials.  In order for legislation to be created surrounding an issue, people have to care 
enough about it to ensure that something is accomplished that will impact the issue.348  In 
Burstein’s analysis, “the combination of salience and substantive public opinion [in studies of 
policy responsiveness and public opinion] always has an effect and is of substantial policy 
importance over three-fifths of the time.  This is consistent with the impact of public opinion 
increasing as salience increases.”349 
II. How Does Public Opinion Explain the Weakness of Federal Action on Gun 
Control? 
The public opinion data assembled here, when contrasted against the final form of gun 
control measures passed in Congress, shows a distinct lack of governmental response to the 
views of the general public.  The majority of the American public has supported many gun 
regulations, including those that have failed multiple times in Congress, like a seven-day waiting 
period to purchase a firearm, closing the “gun show loophole,” and a federal ban of assault 
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weapons.  These measures that the public has supported wholeheartedly, according to polling 
data, have been the subject of tooth-and-nail battles in Congress.  They have either failed 
outright or have not been renewed after their planned sunset period, as shown in the three cases 
presented in the first chapter.   
One instance of this is the failure of the bipartisan Manchin-Toomey bill in April 2013, 
which would have expanded background checks “…to cover all firearms sales at gun shows and 
over the internet, but would have exempted sales between friends and acquaintances outside of 
commercial venues.”350  With a final vote count of 54 to 46, the Senate fell six votes short of 
what would be necessary to pass the bill.351  A Gallup poll taken in late January of that year 
indicated that 91 percent of the public favored passing a law that would require criminal 
background checks for all gun sales, with only 8 percent of people opposed.352  This proposal 
was supported by 97 percent of Democrats, 86 percent of Independents, and 92 percent of 
Republicans.353  Additionally, 53 percent supported President Obama’s original nine-point plan 
to reduce gun violence, which was more controversial and far-reaching than the bipartisan 
background check bill in its final form.354  After the vote occurred, a Gallup poll found that 65 
percent of Americans thought that the Senate should have passed the background check bill.355  
Expressing his disgust with the Senate’s lack of cooperation regarding this bill, President Obama 
said that “the American people are trying to figure out: how can something have 90% support 
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and yet not happen?”356  If the majority of the public supports stricter regulation, then what 
explains the legislation that has passed in Congress, which seems to be unreflective of what the 
majority of the American public wants?   
One factor could be that, although the majority of the public wants one thing, a small and 
influential group is making the most noise about their views, ensuring policy responsiveness. 
Spitzer attributes this problem, which he refers to as the “opinion-policy gap,” to the “outrage-
action-reaction cycle.”357  The narrative surrounding gun control requires a reaction to each new 
incident of gun violence, when the public’s level of pro-gun-control sentiment is higher than 
usual.  The nature of the cycle means that public outrage lasts for only a limited amount of time, 
at a level of passion that is not dependably sustained.  Once the level of commitment to gun 
control drops, gun-rights advocates “…retain a political edge that generally works against a 
direct translation of public preferences into policy enactments.”358   
In general, gun-rights advocates remain on a consistently high level of alert, because the 
NRA has framed the issue in a way that makes gun-rights advocates concerned that their Second 
Amendment rights are at risk.  This gives them an advantage over gun-control advocates, who 
rely on the ephemeral nature of the outrage-action-reaction cycle each time an incident of gun 
violence occurs.  Kleck concurs, finding that public opinion is highly motivated by incidents of 
gun violence, with a pattern of “…support increasing sharply immediately after the event and 
then dropping as memory of the event fades.”359 
 Those who are in favor of gun rights and looser regulations seem to be contributing more 
to advocacy groups that support their views and making their views known to legislators, who try 
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to represent those who are most active and vocal.  Howard Schuman and Stanley Presser 
surveyed people about their support for gun permit laws and what kind of action, if any, survey 
respondents had taken in relation to their views.360  Examining polling results between 1959 and 
1979, they found that approximately 75 percent of Americans favored a law being put into place 
that would require anyone who wanted to buy a gun to first obtain a police permit.361 In spite of  
this consistently favorable view held by a strong majority towards gun permit requirements, no 
nationwide police permit system has been put into place.362   In order to understand this gap 
between favorable public opinion and legislative action, Schuman and Presser surveyed people 
about their support for a police licensing permit for gun ownership, as well as whether or not 
survey respondents had taken various types of action in order to express their opinions.   
They hypothesized that a reason for the disconnect between levels of support and actual 
legislative action taken could result from the public’s intensity of feeling about the issue.363 The 
percentage of people in support might, in fact, not be as important as “…the relative strengths 
with which attitudes are held…”364  Their hypothesis assumed that those in the minority, who 
opposed permit laws, felt very strongly about the issue and translated those feelings into actions 
that had consequences in the political arena.365  Politicians are reluctant to alienate single-issue 
voters. Schuman and Presser acknowledge that “…in a situation in which preferences and the 
propensity to act on them are correlated, an electoral strategy that accommodates each of the 
more intense preferences will defeat an electoral strategy based on majority preferences.”366 
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  Although the intensity of support for gun permits was slightly stronger than the intensity 
of support for gun control opponents, opponents of a gun permit law were far more likely to have 
taken action to express their opinions.367  Actions taken varied, but 20.4 percent of those who 
were anti-permit had written a letter, given money, or both, as compared to only 7.1 percent of 
those on the pro-permit side.368 This influences the perception of the public by those who 
disseminate information about public opinion, as well as decision-makers in government.  
Schuman and Presser observe that “…politicians, editors, and others who take stands on the gun 
permit issue will hear from permit opponents noticeably more often than from permit 
proponents, even though it is the latter who clearly predominate in the country.”369  Additionally, 
the financial support of gun-permit opponents influences how and by whom their message is 
promulgated; they support gun-rights groups and gun-rights candidates during elections.370 
Schuman and Presser ultimately concluded that:  
The apparent inconsistency between these findings seems to be due to the fact that 
strength of feeling and taking action are highly related for permit opponents, but 
not for proponents. Thus among respondents who believe the issue to be most 
important, opponents are quite likely to act on their beliefs, whereas this is not so 
for proponents—a difference that may well reflect the superiority in organizational 
effectiveness of the forces opposed to gun control.371 
 
Burstein echoes this possibility, noting that “political parties may, when in office, enact 
policies favored by their most ardent supporters rather than the general public.”372  Spitzer also 
acknowledges the importance of “pressure-group politics,” since they are often able to influence 
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Congress substantially.373  They are especially effective when public outrage has leveled off and 
gun control ceases to be a politically salient issue for the public. 
Gun Policy is Seen as a Low-Priority Issue 
In a Gallup poll from May 2013, 55 percent of Americans rated “reducing gun violence” 
as a top or high priority for Congressional and Presidential action, ranking it third to last in a list 
of twelve policy issues provided to survey respondents.374  However, gun control’s saliency as an 
issue was drastically influenced by the respondent’s political affiliation.  The survey results 
indicated that “Democrats are more than thirty points more likely than Republicans to 
say…reducing gun violence should be a top or high priority for Congress and the President…The 
divergent perspectives on gun violence underscore that this issue has taken on significant 
political overtones.”375 73 percent of Democrats who responded to the poll ranked “reducing gun 
violence” as a top or high priority for Congress and the President, as compared to 40 percent of 
Republicans and 50 percent of Independents.376   
This poll is just one example illustrating Kleck’s argument that gun control is a low-
salience issue; the general public does not “…seem to have very strong views on the topic or 
think about it a great deal.”377  He points to several different surveys and their responses that 
show volatility and inconsistent levels of support over time for the same set of gun control 
measures.378  When responding to polls about important issues that the country is facing, how to 
reduce crime, and factors that contribute to the levels of crime in the United States, Kleck notes 
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that few people attribute the cause of these societal problems to guns and their lack of 
regulation.379   
Cook and Goss find a similar volatility in responses to public opinion polling, which can be 
responsive to highly-publicized events like mass shootings and accidental gun deaths, but only in 
the short term.  In their review of public opinion polls on gun policy administered by Gallup and 
Pew, Cook and Goss find that Gallup’s survey 
…asks whether laws governing firearm sales should be more strict, less strict, or 
kept as they are—registered a six-point bump in the “more strict” direction after the 
Columbine High School shooting in April 1999.  But by December, support for 
stricter laws had retreated to its pre-Columbine level.  Six months after the most 
deadly shooting in American history, at Virginia Tech in April 2007, support for 
stricter gun laws was actually lower than it had been six months before the event—
meaning that, if the shooting of 50 students and professors moved Americans 
toward stricter gun laws, such sympathy did not last.  There was an eight-point 
surge after the Tucson shooting in January 2011, but it had evaporated by the fall.  
After the shootings at the Aurora, Colorado theater (July 2012), at the Wisconsin 
Sikh temple (August 2012), and the Sandy Hook School (December 2012), support 
for stricter gun laws surged 12 to 15 points.380 
 
This pattern, where public opinion is highly responsive in the immediate aftermath of an 
incident of gun violence but lasts for only a short period of time after the incident, means that it 
is difficult to gauge the public’s true feelings on this matter, or translate the public’s pro-gun-
control response, when it is at an elevated level, into a policy response.  Tom W. Smith, in his 
study of NORC data about public support for gun control measures, also addressed issue saliency 
in relation to the Columbine High School shooting in 1999.  He finds that the saliency of gun 
control was higher in the immediate aftermath of the shooting, and “…respondents in public 
opinion polls became much more likely to mention crime in general or gun violence in particular 
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as the most important problem facing the country.”381  The impact of Columbine was not lasting, 
as Cook and Goss also observed.  Smith writes that: 
There is little indication that Littleton generally increased support for gun control 
in the short term and no sign that it did so after six months.  Thus, Littleton serves 
as a powerful example of how fixed Americans’ views on gun control really are.  
Even a mass school shooting on live television did little to change people’s views 
on the issue.382 
 
III. The Problem with Relying on Public Opinion 
Although the goal of public opinion is to accurately gauge how the public feels about a 
particular issue in the present moment and over time, there are some problems inherent in relying 
on polling and assuming that polls reflect the public’s genuine opinion.  One of the issues with 
relying on public opinion polling is inconsistency in survey design and misleading, unclear, or 
biased wording of polling questions.  Kleck provides an illustrative example: 
In a Time/CNN poll conducted December 2, 1993, 23% of adult Americans favored 
a handgun ban, as described in the following question: “do you favor or oppose a 
law which would make it illegal for any private citizen to own a handgun for any 
purpose?” However, in a Gallup telephone poll conducted just two weeks later, 
support for a handgun ban seemed to be 70% higher, with 39% of adult Americans 
endorsing what appeared to be the same measure the Time/CNN poll had asked 
about. However, there was a critical difference in the wording of the Gallup 
question, which read: “do you think there should or should not be a law that would 
ban the possession of handguns, except by the police and other authorized 
persons?” The key difference is that the Gallup wording…includes a phrase that 
allows respondents to believe that they would be among those persons “authorized” 
to possess handguns...Whether intentionally or not, the Gallup wording effectively 
transmutes a question seemingly referring to a handgun ban into one that could be 
interpreted by many respondents as referring to a handgun licensing law…Clearly, 
seemingly minor variations in wording can produce radical differences in poll 
results.383 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
381 Tom W. Smith, “Public Opinion About Gun Policies,” The Future of Children, 12, 2, (2002) 160. 
382 Ibid. 
383 Kleck, Targeting Guns: Firearms and Their Control, 326. 
	  	   73 
These “minor variations in wording” of polling questions, even when both questions are 
asking about the same issue, produced disparate rates of approval for a theoretical handgun ban. 
This example suggests that public opinion on issues of gun control is not absolute.  Respondents 
are greatly influenced by the language used in individual polling questions.   
Another issue that arises when relying on or trying to interpret public opinion polling is 
the level of knowledge required to answer a polling question with full understanding.  Polling 
questions may use terms that respondents do not understand without defining them, leading 
respondents to guess or make assumptions about the meaning of those terms.  Kleck takes issue 
with even the simplest, most frequently-asked polling question regarding gun control: 
Perhaps the most meaningless public opinion results in the entire gun control area 
are responses to a question asked repeatedly by the Gallup organization: “In 
general, do you feel that the laws covering the sale of handguns should be more 
strict, less strict, or kept as they are now?”  The question necessarily assumes that 
respondents know how strict controls are now, a demonstrably false assumption.384 
 
This assertion casts doubt on both the validity and utility of this kind of polling.  If the 
public is not well informed, then, at best, the poll only tells us about their perceptions of the level 
of gun violence in America and if respondents think it is problematic.  Wilson echoes this doubt 
about the public’s level of information, saying that “it is more likely that this question is a 
surrogate for the respondent’s perception of the seriousness of gun violence insofar as many of 
those citizens who see gun violence as a serious problem are likely to think that gun laws are too 
weak.”385  Kleck argues that respondents are often ill-informed about existing laws and federal 
controls, which greatly impacts polling results and makes results less accurate than if people 
understood the issues.386  If survey respondents believe that there are fewer existing gun controls 
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than what actually have been put into place, they might be more likely to respond that they are in 
favor of stricter controls than what they really would like.387 
 Related to this potential lack of information, another consideration when evaluating 
whether or not public opinion polling is an accurate measure of the public’s true feelings about 
gun control is the situation surrounding a public opinion poll.  A respondent is asked to quickly 
form an opinion about something that he or she may not care about or have ever thought about 
before.  Kleck refers to this phenomenon as a “situational opinion:” “…an opinion held only 
during the survey interview, but one that did not exist before the relevant question was asked and 
that does not persist after the interview is over.”388  Just because a respondent has expressed an 
opinion during the course of the survey does not mean that it is one that he or she holds 
permanently or one that he or she considers actionable in a way that influences gun policy. An 
opinion that the respondent holds might not compel him or her to write letters to legislators, vote, 
join an advocacy organization, or donate funds. This is evident when comparing levels of support 
for their expressed opinions about issues of gun control to poll respondents’ actions related to 
their opinions.  The Schuman and Presser study about respondents’ actions to express their 
opinions about police licensing permits for gun ownership illustrated that, even though more 
people felt strongly that a police licensing permit should be put into place for gun ownership, 
only 7.1 percent of respondents who were pro-permit took some type of action to express that in 
the public arena, whether by writing a letter to lawmakers or giving money to a candidate whose 
views on the issue aligned with their own, as compared to 20.4 percent of those who were anti-
permit.389  Additionally, as Kleck notes, even though there is a “no opinion/ undecided” response 
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to most polling questions, that does not mean that everyone who has not developed an opinion 
will choose it.390   
IV. Evaluating the Trends 
Spitzer, Vizzard, Smith, and Wilson all conclude that public opinion has remained 
consistently in favor of increased governmental control of guns.391  Smith, writing about stability 
of public opinion trends from the 1960s until the date of his own study, thinks that the longevity 
of the gun control issue contributes to the stability of public opinion: 
By and large, attitudes toward firearms regulation have shown great stability over 
the past 40 years.  Gun control has been debated at the national level since the mid-
1960s, so public opinion on gun control tends to be mature and not subject to large 
or sudden fluctuations or shifts.  Except for a period in the late 1980s and early 
1990s when support for gun control measures rose moderately, attitudes have 
generally remained stable over time.392 
  
Certain measures have remained consistently popular, while the public is more 
ambivalent about others.  Spitzer acknowledges that “…the size of the majority favoring stronger 
gun controls has varied” over the years, and attributes low points of public opinion favoring 
stronger gun controls to the “anti-gun control presidencies of Ronald Reagan and George W. 
Bush,” as well as a two-decades long decline in crime rates, including violent crime.393  Overall, 
however, Spitzer sees the overall trend for public support of gun control as one that “has been 
consistent in its support for stricter laws.”394  Elite opinion, according to a study by Kara 
Lindaman and Donald Haider-Markel reproduced in Wilson’s book, became more polarized 
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between 1970 and 1990 and more in favor of gun control, though mass support for gun control 
remained at a consistently higher level.395   
Gun-control measures that have consistently seen a high level of support from the public 
include universal handgun registration, a waiting period for gun purchases, background checks 
for private sales of firearms, and a ban on assault weapons.396  According to Spitzer’s review of 
available polling data: 
66 percent supported registration in 1982, 70 percent in 1985, 81 percent in 1990, 
81 percent in 1991, 76 percent in 2000, and 79 percent in 2006. A series of Roper 
polls have found that, since the early 1970s, an average of 72 percent of Americans 
have favored a law “requiring a person to obtain a police permit” before buying a 
gun (in 2002 this number was 80 percent). In 2002 a National Opinion Research 
Center poll found that 80 percent favored a law requiring police permits as a 
prerequisite for gun purchases.397   
 
The public’s support for a waiting period has been even higher than for universal 
registration; the approval level for a waiting period has never dropped below 80 percent and has 
often been much higher.398  Spitzer’s review of Gallup polls show “…91 percent support in 
1988, 95 percent support in 1990, 93 percent in 1991, 88 percent in 1993 (the year Congress 
enacted a national five-day waiting period as part of the Brady Law), and 93 percent in 2000.  In 
2006 80 percent favored background checks for private gun sales.”399   
Regarding assault weapons, support for a ban has been at lower levels overall than those 
for registration and a waiting period but seems to vary based on the polling question and how (or 
if) it defines an assault weapon.  For example, Spitzer cites a 1992 New York Times/CBS News 
poll which asked “would you favor or oppose a ban on assault weapons—that is, semiautomatic 
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military-style rifles that can hold up to 30 bullets?”400  79 percent of respondents supported the 
ban, while 19 percent opposed it.401  The same poll completed in 2009 found that 54 percent of 
respondents supported an assault weapons ban.402  A 1993 Gallup poll asks the question slightly 
differently, resulting in a different response from the NYT/CBS poll; the question asked was 
“would you favor or oppose a law banning the manufacture, sale, and possession of 
semiautomatic assault guns, such as the AK-47?”  This time, 66 percent of respondents 
supported the ban, while 30 percent did not.403 
Kleck observes a few overall trends that can be elicited from polling data.  He reports that 
“there is more support for regulating sale and purchase of guns than there is for regulating 
possession or ownership.  Thus, support is greater for measures that would affect first-time gun 
buyers than for measures affecting those who already have the guns they want.”404 Respondents 
are motivated by their own interests and are, in general, in favor of gun control measures that 
appear not to impact them or “…their own possession, acquisition, or use of guns.”405 Overall, 
public opinion polling trends show that, for the American public, “the stronger the measures [for 
gun control legislation], the less support there is.”406 
The outright ban of firearms has never reached a high level of popularity, and public 
support for such a measure has consistently been on the decline since polls have posed that 
question. 
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However, not all scholars draw the same conclusions from public opinion polls. Kleck 
argues that polling data and trends over time indicate that, for the most part, people are both ill-
informed and ambivalent about gun control.  He writes that: 
The available evidence supports the following conclusions: (1) most people have 
no real opinion or only very weak or unstable opinions on specific narrow gun 
control proposals; (2) most people have only very general opinions on broad issues 
like gun control rather than specific, strongly held opinions on narrow issues, and 
(3) the few who do have strong, stable opinions in the gun control area are mostly 
anticontrol, because most of them are gun owners.407 
 
Public Opinion Trends 1980-1999 
In a study of polling data about questions of firearms policy and gun ownership in the 
United States between 1987 and 1992, Jon S. Vernick, Stephen P. Teret, Kim Ammann Howard, 
Michael D. Teret, and Garen J. Wintemute used 270 polling questions to draw conclusions about 
the American public’s views on gun control policy during that period.408 
They found that “the public’s answers to these [polling] questions demonstrate, in 
general, a willingness to accept more control over the manufacture, sale and possession of 
guns.”409  The ranges of the public’s support for each regulation included in the polling data are 
as follows: 
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Public Support For Gun Policy Options, Selected Questions, 1987-1992 
Gun Policy Option Approval Range410 
Ban manufacture of Saturday Night Specials 68% to 73% 
Ban manufacture of assault weapons 72% to 73% 
Stricter regulation of firearm sales 60% to 78% 
Stricter regulation of handgun sales 60% to 65% 
Ban sale of all handguns 40% to 42% 
Ban sale of Saturday Night Specials 68% to 73% 
Ban sale of assault weapons 72% to 75% 
Seven-day handgun waiting period 80% to 95% 
Ban possession of all firearms 29% 
Ban possession of handguns 29% to 43% 
Ban possession of Saturday Night Specials 68% to 71% 
Ban possession of assault weapons 72% to 73% 
Register possession of all firearms 67% to 79% 
Register possession of all handguns 72% to 84% 
License carrying of guns outside the home 81% to 88% 
Individual right to bear arms protected by the 
Constitution 
68% to 90% 
 
They found that most of the public disfavored Saturday Night Specials and assault 
weapons in general; a large majority would support banning the manufacture, sale, and 
possession of both Saturday Night Specials and assault weapons.411  They also supported stricter 
regulation, including a seven day waiting period, but not an outright ban, on the sale of firearms 
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and handguns.412  There was very strong support for registration of firearms and handgun 
possession, and licensing to carry guns outside the home.413  Vernick, Teret, Teret, Ammann 
Howard, and Wintemute thought that the polling data should serve as a sign of encouragement 
for legislators to pass more stringent regulations on guns.414  They wrote that:  
Given the generally supportive public opinion for a variety of gun control policies, 
legislators can feel more confident that a number of proposed laws intended to 
reduce gun violence would enjoy widespread support.  In fact, every gun policy 
option we summarize, other than proposals to completely ban the sale or possession 
of all firearms or handguns, is favored by a majority of all Americans.415 
 
Surveying National Opinion Research Center (NORC) polls from 1996 to 1999, Tom W. 
Smith writes that “these polls show that public support for the regulation of firearms is strong, 
deep, and widespread.  Large majorities back most policies to control the manufacture and sale 
of guns, increase gun safety, and restrict criminals from acquiring firearms.”416  Support for 
general gun control measures were, for the most part, high.  These results are similar to findings 
from the Vernick et al. study.  The only measures that the majority of the American public did 
not support were a ban on handguns except by authorized persons and a total ban on 
handguns.417  The table compiled by Smith from the NORC data is reproduced below: 
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Support For General Gun Control Measures, 1999 
Gun Control Measure % In Support418 
Tamper-resistant serial numbers on guns 89.6 
Police permit needed before gun may be 
purchased 82 
Mandatory background check and five-day 
waiting period for gun purchases 80.7 
Mandatory registration of handguns 80 
Must be 21 to buy handgun 79.9 
Require background check for private sales of 
guns 78.6 
Restrict sales of handgun ammunition like 
handguns themselves 73.4 
Willing to be $25 in taxed to reduce gun 
injuries 71.4 
Keep guns from criminals, even if that makes 
it harder for law-abiding citizens to obtain 
guns 
69.8 
Prohibit gun imports not allowed in country 
of origin 69.2 
Ban high-capacity ammunition magazines 66.6 
Handgun owners must be at least licensed and 
trained 65.7 
Mandatory registration of rifles/shotguns 61.3 
Concealed carrying only for those with 
special needs 55.9 
Prohibit importing of guns 55.1 
Ban “Saturday Night Specials” 54.2-58.2 
General concealed-carrying laws make 
communities less safe 45.2 
Ban possession of handguns, except by police 
or authorized persons 38.5 
Total ban on handguns 12.8 
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Recent Polling Trends and Outlook: 2012-Present 
 The past four years have seen a shift in polling data trends and public support for various 
gun-control measures.  At several points in time, a majority of Americans have expressed a 
desire to prioritize gun rights over gun control and have not wanted stricter gun control laws to 
pass.  The tables below summarize polling data from recent years, taken from Pew Research 
Center, Gallup, and ABC News. 
Gun Rights vs. Gun Control 
Pew Research Center has been tracking responses to the question “what do you think is 
more important—to protect the rights of Americans to own guns, or to control gun ownership?”  
since 1993.419  The responses are reproduced below. 
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420 
 
Carroll Doherty notes that, although the question requires respondents to take a polar 
position on either rights or control, this has not proved to be a problem for respondents.421  
There is no indication that people have any difficulty answering this question or are 
ambivalent about the topic.  In fact, when asked a follow-up about the strength of 
their opinion, 81% of those who said it is more important to control gun ownership 
felt strongly about that position; 91% of those who said it is more important to 
protect gun rights felt strongly.422 
 
Pew views questions of this kind as not meant to capture all the nuances of public opinion 
on every aspect of gun control, including specific measures that the public may favor or not.  
Instead, this kind of question is meant as a marker of “…long-term change in the overall climate 
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of public opinion…”423  In this case, change in the climate began in 2009, where respondents 
began to be more evenly divided in their support for either gun rights or gun control.  In 2012, 
the poll was conducted shortly after the Newtown, CT school shooting, and 49% of respondents 
thought that gun control was more important, over 42% who thought that gun rights were.424  
Opinion was divided again by May 2013, and, in December 2014, 52% of respondents 
prioritized gun rights, while 46% prioritized gun control.425 
The all-time highs that Pew notes are yet another shift in public opinion about gun laws 
that has happened over a relatively short period of time.  During Fall 2014, Gallup found that 
fewer than half of Americans wanted stricter laws regulating firearms sales, while Pew found 
that, for the first time, more Americans favored prioritizing gun rights over gun control.426 
Gallup recorded 47% of respondents who favored stricter gun laws covering firearms sales.427  
The reasons for this increase in support vary.  Part of it is political. Republicans “…have become 
far more supportive of gun rights during the Obama years.”428 
Another facet of this trend relates to Americans’ perception of crime and how guns relate 
to crime.  Crime levels, particularly violent crime, began to decline precipitously in the 1990s, 
and people responded to that trend in the way one would expect. Pew’s survey asking 
respondents whether there was more crime in the United States in that year than the previous 
year noted declining rates of responses in the affirmative beginning in the early 1990s until the 
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early 2000s.429  More recently, people have begun to perceive crime as on the rise, although, in 
reality, crime statistics have been “…near 20-year lows.”430  Previously, respondents who had 
been afraid of rising crime levels had favored increased gun control measures.  Now, the trend 
that Pew has measured shows that respondents who are worried about crime think that gun laws 
should either be kept as they are or relaxed.431  Andrew Kohut, the Pew researcher analyzing this 
particular survey data, infers that “…we are at a moment when most Americans believe crime 
rates are rising and when most believe gun ownership—not gun control—makes people safer.”432 
Overall Satisfaction with Gun Legislation as it Currently Stands 
Gallup found that, after a slight rise in Americans’ satisfaction about national policy on 
guns, which hovered around 50 percent between 2007 and 2012, Americans have expressed 
more dissatisfaction with gun control laws and the way they stand in the past three years.433  42 
percent of Americans expressed dissatisfaction in 2012, but the percentage jumped to 51 percent 
in the following year.434  The same poll, when conducted this year, registered 62% dissatisfaction 
with national gun policy, an eleven-percentage-point jump from the previous year and the 
highest since the first time Gallup polled that particular question in 2001.435  Gallup attributes the 
levels to the fact that the poll was posed early in the year, and the “several high-profile shootings 
and President Barack Obama’s recent executive actions on guns” were on respondents’ minds.436  
The organization notes that dissatisfaction was also high “at the close of the Clinton 
administration,” possibly notable because of former President Clinton’s work on the Assault 
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Weapons ban, and high in late 2012, immediately after the Sandy Hook school shooting.437  
Gallup’s two related polls, including the first about level of satisfaction with current national gun 
policy, and an additional follow-up poll about whether respondents wanted stricter, less strict, or 
the same gun laws in place, are reproduced below.   
438 
Gallup’s follow-up poll to the above question, “would you like to see gun laws in this 
country made more strict, less strict, or remain as they are?”  was asked only of the respondents 
who were dissatisfied with current federal gun control policy.439  Regarding the data for 2016, 
Gallup’s analysts note that, although more people are dissatisfied with current gun laws because 
they would like them to be stricter, the percentage of people who want gun laws to be more 
stringent and the percentage of people who would like gun laws to be more relaxed are both “at 
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or near their 16-year highs…a sign of increasing polarization on that issue.”440  Gallup also 
found that 75% of Democrats were dissatisfied, compared with 59% of Independents and 54% of 
Republicans.441  68% of the Democrats who were dissatisfied wanted gun laws to be stricter, 
with 12% of Republicans feeling the same way.  24% of Republicans want to see less strict gun 
laws, while 4% of Democrats feel that way.442  
443 
Implementation of Background Checks for Gun Ownership 
Background checks have maintained high levels of support in recent years, even after the 
Senate failed to expand background checks on gun purchases in 2013.444  It should be noted that 
73% of Americans were in favor of Congress passing a background check bill that would close 
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the gun show loophole in 2013, according to a Pew poll from the same year on that issue.445  
Despite high levels of public support, respondents expressed little confidence that Congress 
would pass the background check bill.  55 percent of respondents to the Pew poll said that it was 
“unlikely that Congress will pass significant new gun control laws this year.”446  A Gallup poll 
conducted after the Senate’s failure to pass expanded background checks recorded 65% of 
respondents who thought that the bill should have been passed, including 85% of Democrats and 
45% of Republicans who responded.447 This low level of confidence in the ability of elected 
officials to respond to the public’s desire for gun control laws like expanded background checks 
is important to keep in mind in light of the theory about policy responsiveness to public opinion 
discussed earlier in this chapter. 
Overall, Pew found that 85% of Americans favor background checks for sales made at 
gun shows or privately as of August 2015.448  This level of support has not changed much over 
the three most recent surveys conducted, two in 2013 and one in 2015.449  It is important to note 
that background checks for gun shows and other private sales-measures that would close the 
“gun-show loophole” that the Brady Law left open attract high levels of support, even from 
Republicans and respondents who think that gun laws should be made less strict in this 
country.450 
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453 
Assault Weapons Ban 
A ban on assault weapons attracts far lower levels of support than do background checks, 
but the overall level of public support for such a ban is 57%.454  It is notable that an assault-
weapons ban attracts levels of support that are in the low to mid forty percent range for 
Republicans and those who favor gun rights over gun control.455 
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458 
V. How does Public Opinion Relate to the Policy Process of the Three Cases? 
 An overwhelming majority of the American public supported many of the key measures 
of the Brady law during the legislative process for the bill. In a 1993 survey, Kleck found that 87 
percent favored both the five-day waiting period to purchase a handgun and the background 
check provision.459  Carroll Doherty observes that Pew’s December 1993 poll asking whether 
respondents thought it was more important to prioritize gun rights or gun control found that 57% 
of respondents thought controlling gun ownership was more important, while 34% said gun 
rights were more important.460  A report summary, published on December 10, 1993, found that  
concern about crime has supplanted the recession as the public’s single greatest 
worry…Americans express strong support for Bill Clinton’s efforts to control the 
use of handguns.  Most also say that they would like to see the President challenge 
the National Rifle Association, which a growing number of Americans feel has too 
much an influence on gun control laws in this country.461 
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VI. Conclusions 
 When considering which gun control measures the American public supports against 
measures that have succeeded in Congress, it is clear that elected representatives have not been 
responsive to what the majority of Americans wants.  The level of satisfaction with national gun 
laws are at their lowest point since Gallup began tracking them in 2001.  Overall, the majority of 
the American public has consistently supported many moderate gun control measures, policies 
that are often called “common-sense” gun laws.  These include criminal background checks for 
firearms sold at gun shows and over the internet and a ban on the sale of assault weapons.  
Although these measures have attracted high levels of support from the public and elected 
representatives should take responses to these public opinion polls as an indication to vote for 
increased federal restrictions on firearms sales and ownership, the Manchin-Toomey bill, which 
would have extended criminal background checks to gun show and internet sales, has failed 
twice in the Senate.  Attempts to revive the assault weapons ban have failed consistently ever 
since the ban reached its sunset period in 2004.   
 For other issues where constituents are more engaged, this lack of constituent 
representation would probably have negative consequences for members of Congress.  However, 
gun control is a low-salience issue for many members of the public, especially those who, in 
theory, support it.  Elected officials are far more likely to hear from their pro-gun-rights 
constituents, leading them to believe that, should they take action to create further restrictions on 
guns, their constituents will be unhappy and will not support them in the future.  People in 
support of further gun control measures are more likely to care about the issue in the short term 
or in the immediate aftermath of a shooting incident, whereas gun-rights advocates are highly 
mobilized and consistently take action to make sure that their rights are not infringed upon, 
meaning that elected officials hear from them more often.   
	  	   94 
The result of this apathy and disillusionment of the majority of Americans, combined with the 
misinformation about public opinion on gun control that elected officials receive, means that 
elected officials will continue to vote against gun control bills until they are dissuaded to do so 
by their constituents.  The form of dissuasion that constituents may take, whether it is declining 
to reelect officials who vote against gun control bills, making their voices heard on the issue by 
writing to their representatives, or donating only to candidates who align with their views, vary, 
but all are possible options to increase the responsiveness of elected officials on this matter. 
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Chapter 4: Current and Future Outlook 
	  
I. Current Situation 
 Although 2015 and 2016 have seen several shooting incidents that received prominent 
attention in the news and prompted discussion about gun control, actions taken on the federal 
level to further restrict gun violence have been mixed.  President Obama’s executive order, 
which was announced in January of 2016, addresses some areas of gun control policy that have 
long needed improvement and further enforcement, like closing the gun show loophole and 
clarifying HIPAA reporting regulations to the National Instant Criminal Background check 
system that prevent mentally ill people from purchasing firearms.  However, this executive order 
has met with some backlash, including concerns from Congress that President Obama has 
overstepped his authority. 
   President Obama has also been compelled to backpedal on certain gun control 
regulations due to congressional disapproval.  In March of 2015, he dropped his plan to ban 
green-tip ammunition, which had previously been exempted from stricter regulation because of 
its popularity in shooting sports.462  Concerns arose because green-tip bullets can pierce through 
the type of body armor worn by police officers and are often used in automatic handguns that can 
fire multiple rounds of ammunition.463  The House Judiciary Committee Chairman, Bob 
Goodlatte, sent a letter to the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms objecting to the plan, 
citing Second Amendment concerns, that was co-signed by 238 members of the House of 
Representatives.  A separate letter was sent on behalf of members of the Senate and signed by 52 
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of them, which read, in part, that “ATF should not propose to ban…any widely-used form of 
ammunition used by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes.”464 
 At the end of March 2015, Senator Marco Rubio (R-FL) and Representative Jim Jordan 
(R-OH) introduced the Second Amendment Act of 2015, which seeks to nullify the District of 
Columbia’s current gun regulations and would allow residents increased access to firearms.465  
Measures of the bill would “remove the authority of the D.C. Council to enact restrictive gun 
control measures; allow D.C. residents to buy guns in Maryland and Virginia; repeal the 
District’s firearm registration system; create a permitting system for carrying concealed 
weapons; and allow private entities and secure public buildings to determine whether guns are 
allowed on their property.”466  No further action has been taken since the bill’s introduction on 
March 26 of last year. 
President Obama’s 2016 Executive Order: Provisions 
On January 4th of this year, President Obama released a plan of executive actions 
designed to reduce gun violence in America, focusing chiefly on enhancement of NICS, the 
background check system that is currently in place for prospective purchasers from licensed gun 
dealers, and increased education and enforcement of gun control on a state level.467 Reports have 
found that, although a similar proposal had originally been drafted in 2014, it had been shelved 
due to legal concerns.468  According to Juliet Eilperin of the Washington Post, the ideas that have 
been proposed in President Obama’s executive actions this year “…gained new momentum after 
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the Roseburg [Oregon, at a community college in October of 2015] shooting,”469 following the 
familiar outrage-action-reaction cycle that Spitzer describes.   In his official press release, 
President Obama reported that:  
Over the past decade in America, more than 100,000 people have been killed as a 
result of gun violence…Many of these crimes [carried out with firearms] were 
committed by people who never should have been able to purchase a gun in the first 
place.470 
 
He also referenced the other causes and consequences of gun violence, including suicide, 
accidental shootings, especially of or by children, and police officers dying in gunfights with 
criminals.471  Citing the high number of gun-related deaths and rallying public opinion behind 
him, President Obama declared that  
…the vast majority of Americans—including the vast majority of gun owners—
believe that we must take sensible steps to address these horrible tragedies. The 
President and the Vice President are committed to using every tool at the 
Administration’s disposal to reduce gun violence.472 
 
Area I: Expansion of Federal Oversight through the FBI and ATF 
Arguably, the most important executive action that President Obama is trying to achieve 
is the closure of the “gun show loophole” that the Brady Law purposely left open back in 1992.  
This executive action will require that both brick-and-mortar retail shops selling firearms be 
licensed and conduct background checks, as the Brady Law did, and will extend to online and 
gun show sellers.473  According to the National Conference of State Legislatures, the licensing 
requirement affects anyone “engaged in the business of selling guns, regardless of how frequent 
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or how many sales there are.”474  The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF) will be 
responsible for monitoring compliance with this new law.475 
One of the actions taken has been to crack down on licensing of firearms sellers and 
ensuring that they are requiring their buyers to undergo background checks.476  The ATF is 
tasked with administering a new rule that would necessitate background checks for prospective 
buyers “…of certain dangerous firearms and other items who purchase them through a trust, 
corporation, or other entity.”477  Further onus of responsibility is placed on gun sellers with 
another facet of the executive order, which requires them to report any firearms that have been 
lost or stolen in transit to the police.478  Guns that are lost or stolen are used more often to 
commit crimes than guns that are acquired legally, so it is the Administration’s hope that clearly 
delineating reporting responsibility will cut down on guns that cannot be tracked if something 
unexpected happens.479  It also criminalizes any sellers who do not comply with these measures, 
punishing noncompliance with a maximum of $250,000 in fines or five years of jail time.480 
Acknowledging the ATF’s increased powers and responsibilities, the executive order calls for 
increased staffing of the Bureau, budgeting salaries for 200 additional staff members for Fiscal 
Year 2017.481  
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In light of the high volume of mass shootings that have occurred in recent years, over 20 
states have passed laws regulating the purchase and carrying of firearms, but an underground 
market for guns has emerged as a way that criminals circumvent these new restrictions.482  More 
than 50,000 guns are trafficked across state lines every year, usually from states like Virginia, 
Florida, and Georgia, which have weaker gun laws, into the Northeast, where gun laws are 
generally more strict.483  In Chicago, which has some of the “tightest municipal gun regulations” 
in the country, many obtain firearms by driving to Indiana, a neighboring state less than an hour 
away from the city, where background checks are not required for private sales.484 Research from 
the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms finds that guns used to commit crimes in states 
with weaker gun laws are generally purchased in-state.485  The new restrictions placed on gun 
sellers through the executive order seek to target elements of gun trafficking where federal 
jurisdiction applies.  Unfortunately, the reason why gun trafficking from state to state is so 
widespread is that gun laws on the state level vary in their stringency.   
One of the other key aspects of the executive order is an expansion and improvement of 
the National Instant Criminal Background Check System (NICS), which has been one of the 
(purposefully) weakest provisions of the Brady Law since its passage.  The improvements will 
involve “…processing background checks 24 hours a day, 7 days a week,” and streamlining the 
process used to alert police and other authorities when someone who is not permitted to possess a 
firearm attempts to buy one.486  It gives the FBI the authority to hire 230 new staff members to 
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work on this initiative specifically, increasing the examiner staff by 50 percent.487  This process 
of improvement and allocation of additional resources seeks to keep guns from individuals who 
acquire guns through a technicality, even if they should not have them.  Currently, there is a 
federal law in place that allows gun dealers to complete firearms sales to customers if a 
background check comes back without issue or if it takes longer than three days to complete.488  
If the process is more streamlined and efficient, fewer people will acquire guns due to a system 
overload. 
Area II: Health and Safety Regarding Firearms and Who Can Access Them 
 One problem that has been encountered consistently with background checks is that they 
have let individuals who are not allowed to possess guns due to mental health issues or the 
presence of an established criminal record fall through the cracks because of differing standards 
of privacy and an unwillingness to relinquish records that often would otherwise remain private.  
The 2016 executive order would require that the Department of Health and Human Services 
work with individual states to “…remove unnecessary legal barriers preventing states from 
reporting relevant information about people prohibited from possessing a gun for specific mental 
health reasons.”489  This would allow the information to be accessible to an FBI agent conducting 
a background check. HIPAA (the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996) 
is often cited by individual states as the reason for why they have not complied with the FBI’s 
request for mental health records used in background checks.490  The Department of Health and 
Human Services, HIPAA’s administrating agency, has since clarified its standing in ways that 
would allow NICS examiners to access the necessary information to determine whether or not an 
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individual may purchase a firearm.491  The clarified HIPAA rule, which went into effect on 
January 6 of this year, states that 
covered entities that order involuntary commitments or make other adjudications 
that subject individuals to the Federal mental health prohibitor, or that serve as 
repositories of the relevant data, are permitted to use or disclose the information 
needed for NICS reporting of such individuals either directly to NICS or to a State 
repository of NICS data.  Thus, if a covered health care entity also has a role in the 
relevant mental health adjudications or serves as a State data repository, it may now 
disclose the relevant information for NICS reporting purposes under this new 
permission even if it is not designated as a HIPAA hybrid entity or required by state 
law to report.492 
  
The federal mental health prohibitor referred to in the final rule is the regulation that 
disqualifies individuals from “shipping, transporting, possessing, or receiving a firearm”  who 
have “…been involuntarily committed to a mental institution, found incompetent to stand trial or 
or not guilty by reasons of insanity, or otherwise have been determined by a court, board, 
commission, or other lawful authority to be a danger to themselves or others or to lack the mental 
capacity to contract or manage their own affairs, as a result of marked subnormal intelligence or 
mental illness, incompetency, condition, or disease.”493 The Department of Health and Human 
Services commented on the need for a more specific regulation, saying that “an express 
permission would provide clarity and remove a barrier to their [individual states’] reporting.”494   
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 The executive order also seeks to take preventative measures regarding mental health.  
The Obama administration  “… is proposing a new $500 million investment to increase access to 
mental health care.”495  
 Another facet of the executive order’s health and safety provisions urges several different 
federal agencies, state leaders, and private sector actors to make firearms more safe and limit 
people’s access to them.  The Department of Justice, Department of Homeland Security, and the 
Department of Defense have been directed by the President to conduct or sponsor research into 
technology that will increase gun safety and encourage the development and further 
dissemination of smart gun technology.496 Increased gun safety features that are part of the 
physical firearm would cut down on accidental gun deaths, since they often result from 
mishandling firearms or accidentally discharging loaded guns.497 ATF has created an Internet 
Investigations Center to track online sales and trafficking of firearms, in the hope that the Bureau 
will be able to track and prevent more illegal sales.498  He also urged individual state 
governments and the private sector to contribute to the process of increasing the level of 
difficulty for “…dangerous individuals to get their hands on a gun.”499 
He then extended the responsibility to the legislative branch, calling upon Congress to fill 
“the gaps in our country’s gun laws” by passing “the kind of commonsense gun safety reforms 
supported by the majority of the American people.”500   
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Reaction/ Backlash 
 President Obama’s executive orders met, as expected, with backlash from Congressional 
Republicans, Republican presidential candidates, and the NRA.  Jennifer Baker, an NRA 
spokesperson, responded to news of the executive order by characterizing the president’s actions 
as “doing what he always does when he doesn’t get his way, which is defy the will of the people 
and issue an executive order.  This is nothing more than a political stunt to appease anti-gun 
billionaire Michael Bloomberg and will do nothing to increase public safety.”501  Reports from 
the Washington Post say that Republican party representatives had been “shut out” by the 
administration, mainly due to their efforts in blocking legislation that, had it been passed, would 
have expanded background checks after the December 2012 Sandy Hook school shooting.502   
 In a response that was echoed among many Congressional Republicans, Paul Ryan’s 
spokesman said: 
The administration has not communicated with us, and we have not been briefed.  
We will consider options once we have information, but what seems apparent is 
none of these ideas would have prevented the recent atrocities.  Our focus should 
be on the consistent causes of these acts—mental illness and terrorism—rather than 
infringing on law-abiding Americans’ constitutional rights. 503 
 
 Some Republican candidates in the 2016 presidential race saw the executive order as an 
opportunity to clarify their positions on gun control. A spokeswoman for Ted Cruz characterized 
the executive order as the President “…trying to distract Americans from his failure to address 
the true threat of radical Islamic terrorism, and instead going after the rights of law-abiding 
American citizens—it is complete lunacy.”504 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
501 Eilperin, “Obama Plans Curbs on Guns.” 
502 Eilperin, “Obama Plans Curbs on Guns.” 
503 Ibid. 
504 Ibid. 
	  	  104 
Public Opinion on These Measures  
The public, on the other hand, has backed President Obama on some of the measures that 
the executive order would put into place, while showing a resistance towards others.  A 
December 2015 Washington Post/ABC News poll found that 89 percent of Americans supported 
background checks for online and gun show purchases.505  However, a growing number of 
Americans, in the wake of some instances of domestic terrorism, including the shooting in San 
Bernardino, California, in December of last year, have perceived allowing more Americans to be 
armed in public as a potential solution.  In the same poll, 47 percent of respondents supported 
encouraging more people carrying guns in public as a response to terrorist attacks over the 
percentage of respondents, 42 percent, who thought that the appropriate response would be to 
enact stricter gun control laws.506 
 Regarding public opinion about the executive order itself, a CNN/ORC poll was 
conducted on January 5th and 6th of this year.507  As with most public opinion surveys about gun 
control, results were strongly polarized, not at all cohesive, and characterized by strong feelings 
about the issues.  53 percent of respondents said that they disapproved of the way that President 
Obama was handling gun policy, while 43 percent of respondents approved of it.508  They also 
disapprove of the way he handled the situation.  54 percent of respondents disapproved of his use 
of executive order to implement these policies.509  However, when reminded of the specific 
measures that would be accomplished through executive order, including requiring background 
checks for gun shows and online purchases and making it easier for the FBI to run background 
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checks, 67 percent of respondents approved, while 32 percent disapproved.510  In a follow-up 
question, 43 percent of respondents strongly favored the new measures, 24 percent moderately 
favored them, and 21 percent of respondents strongly opposed them.511  Even though the 
majority of respondents approved of these changes, they did not think that they will impact gun 
violence.  When asked whether or not they thought that the executive order’s provisions would 
reduce gun-related deaths in the United States, 57 percent of respondents thought that the 
changes would not be effective.512 
 One of the most remarkable aspects of the poll was how respondents reacted to the 
President’s actions on gun control.  This polling question was asked of respondents on two 
instances, once between December 17 and 21 of 2015, and a second time on January 5 and 6 of 
2016.513  There was only a one-percent difference between the two polling instances where 
respondents said that the President had gone too far, while there was an eight percentage-point 
difference between instances where respondents said that the President has not gone far enough 
to change the nation’s gun laws.514  The poll results are reproduced side-by-side below. 
CNN/ORC Poll, January 5-6, 2016: “When it comes to gun control laws, do you think 
Barack Obama has gone too far, has taken the right amount of action, or has not gone 
far enough to change the nation’s gun laws?” 
%515 
Gone too far 38 
About the right amount 31 
Not far enough 30 
No opinion 1 
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CNN/ORC Poll, December 17-21, 2015: “When it comes to gun control laws, do you 
think Barack Obama has gone too far, has taken the right amount of action, or has not 
gone far enough to change the nation’s gun laws?” 
%516 
Gone too far 39 
About the right amount 20 
Not far enough 38 
No opinion 3 
 
Anticipated Impact of Executive Order 
 The executive order is, by nature, limited.  Since there are “clear legal limitations on 
[President Obama’s] authority,” the impact of the executive order is modest.517 It clarifies 
existing law instead of creating new ones.  In a statement made in January regarding the 
executive order, the President said: “We have to be clear that this is not going to solve every 
violent crime in this country.  It’s not going to prevent every mass shooting; it’s not going to 
keep every gun out of the hands of a criminal.”518 
The onus for change is now on Congress, which has the power to make legislative changes 
that President Obama does not.  However, considering the derision and dismay expressed by 
prominent Republicans, the majority party in both the House and the Senate, it is impossible to 
think that they will buttress the executive order with legislation of their own any time soon. 
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II. Future Outlook for Federal Gun Control Measures 
Much of the future outlook for gun control policy depends on who will become elected 
representatives in the United States. Three out of four of the front-running presidential 
candidates in the 2016 elections have weak or actively hostile policy positions on gun control.  
34 Senators are either retiring or up for re-election in 2016, as are all 435 seats in the House of 
Representatives.519 Most of the Congressional seats that are up for reelection belong to 
Republican incumbents.520   
Although incumbents usually have an advantage in elections, it is possible that some 
members of Congress who have blocked federal gun control measures in the past will be 
replaced by representatives who are more supportive of gun control policy, increasing the 
feasibility of federal gun control legislation being passed through Congress.  Gun-friendly 
Republican Senators who are up for reelection who have competitive challengers include Kelly 
Ayotte of New Hampshire, Ron Johnson of Wisconsin, and Rob Portman of Ohio.  All three of 
them “…voted against background checks in 2013, face competitive Democratic challengers, 
and received intense scrutiny for their votes.”521 
Congressional Support for Gun Control 
 Although the 2016 election cycle has the potential to influence Congressional action on 
gun control, it seems unlikely that Congress will take action on gun control, even if the balance 
of Republicans to Democrats in Congress changes. Bipartisanship in Congress is at an all-time 
low, according to the Bipartisanship Index, a project maintained by Georgetown University’s 
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McCourt School of Public Policy and the Lugar Center, which tracks how often each member of 
Congress works across party lines.522 The Index shows that cooperation on legislation has been 
declining since 1999.523 The measures of bipartisanship between 2013 and 2015 have been the 
three lowest scores of the eleven for which the Index has compiled data.524   
In 2014, CQ Roll Call reviewed the Congressional vote studies that the organization had 
performed since the 1950s and found that “…comparing the results year over year and as six-
decade trend lines offers positive proof that partisanship and polarization are the drivers of 
legislative behavior more than in any other period since at least the start of the Eisenhower 
Administration.”525  In a political environment defined by “partisanship and polarization,” it is 
clear that little action can be taken on gun control, a policy area that can be easily characterized 
by those two words. 
Congress’ failure to pass the Manchin-Toomey Bill, which has been put to a vote twice, 
once in 2013 and once in 2015, is an illustrative example of what the future will likely hold for 
any potential federal gun control measures. The bill was co-sponsored by Senator Joe Manchin, a 
Democrat from West Virginia, and Pat Toomey, a Republican Senator from Pennsylvania, in an 
effort to show a bipartisan front and attract support from both sides of the aisle.526   It was 
created in the wake of the Newtown, Connecticut elementary school shooting in 2012, when 
levels of  public support for increased gun-control measures were elevated. The key provision of 
the bill was the expansion of background checks to cover commercial sales, including over the 
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internet and at gun shows.527  This particular policy proposal has consistently attracted high 
levels of approval in public opinion polls.  A Gallup poll on the issue taken before the 2013 vote 
indicated that 91 percent of Americans favored passing a law that would require criminal 
background checks for all gun sales.528 
The first time the bill was put to a vote in the Senate, in 2013, the vote was, at 54 votes in 
favor to 46 opposed, incredibly close to the 60 needed to move forward.529  Of the four 
Democrats who defected, three of them faced reelection in 2014 and all represented “rural states 
with strong gun cultures.”530  Only four Republican Senators voted for the bill.531   
After the San Bernardino shootings in December 2015 and the renewed outcry about gun 
control that followed, Senators Manchin and Toomey revived the bill.  This time, the vote failed 
in the Senate with 48 votes in favor and 50 opposed.532  Advocating in favor of  reviving the bill, 
particularly in the light of the San Bernardino shooting, Senator Manchin said that: 
It’s for law-abiding gun owners and it’s a good piece of legislation and it’s most 
reasonable and it’s been accepted by people around the gun community.  We have 
an opportunity to do it now with the height of everything happening.  For us not to 
do anything, just sit here and be mum, would be just as bad.533 
 
In 2015, a Pew poll found that 85 percent of Americans supported background checks for 
sales made both privately and at gun shows.534  Although an overwhelming majority of 
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Americans supported this bill, members of Congress did not represent the desires of their 
constituents on this issue without any public outcry or disapproval.  The apathy of a large 
majority of Americans, coupled with Congress’ fear of the NRA and a reluctance to compromise 
on legislation, is a toxic combination that will prevent further federal policy innovation on this 
issue.  As Vizzard concludes in Shots in the Dark, his own book about gun control policy, 
“without a change in the political environment, the gun-control issue will remain indefinitely 
stalemated.  Little to no evidence exists that a natural, incremental process will eventually 
resolve the issue or bring about comprehensive policy.”535 
Likelihood of Support for Gun Control from Current Presidential Candidates 
 Although campaign promises are not always indicative of future executive action, only 
one of the candidates in the 2016 presidential race has come out decisively in favor of stronger 
gun control measures.  Hillary Clinton, after the shooting in Roseburg, Oregon, said “what is 
wrong with us, that we cannot stand up to the NRA and the gun lobby, and the gun 
manufacturers they represent?”536  She has been endorsed by both the Brady Campaign and 
former Congresswoman Gabrielle Giffords, who started Americans for Responsible Solutions.537  
Clinton released an action plan for gun violence prevention in October of 2015.538  Her campaign 
promises regarding gun control include “comprehensive federal background check legislation,” 
taking administrative action to tighten the gun show and internet sales loophole, and “closing the 
Charleston loophole”—so-called because the shooter in the Charleston, South Carolina church 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
535 Vizzard, Shots in The Dark: The Policy, Politics, and Symbolism of Gun Control, 178. 
536 Rebecca Leber, “Gun Control Can Swing the 2016 Election,” The New Republic, January 14, 2016, 
https://newrepublic.com/article/127473/gun-control-can-swing-2016-election.  
537 Gabriel Debenedetti, “Brady Campaign to Endorse Hillary Clinton,” Politico, January 12, 2016, 
http://www.politico.com/story/2016/01/brady-campaign-gun-control-hillary-clinton-217605#ixzz3x2q87LWg.   
538 Hillary Clinton, “Gun Violence Prevention,” hillaryclinton.com, https://www.hillaryclinton.com/issues/gun-
violence-prevention/.  
	  	  111 
shooting in June 2015 was able to purchase a gun in spite of his criminal record.539   A provision 
in the National Instant Criminal Background Check System allows a gun sale to proceed without 
a background check if it has not been completed within 72 hours.540   
 Clinton’s campaign promises also involve “ensur[ing] that the safety of our communities 
is prioritized over the profits of the gun lobby.”541  She is the only candidate that has publicly 
spoken out against the power of the gun lobby and made campaign promises to try to minimize 
its influence in Congress.  One of the points of her plan is her promise to “repeal the gun 
industry’s unique immunity protection,” referring to the 2005 Protection of Lawful Commerce in 
Arms Act, which prohibits “…civil liability actions from being brought or continued against 
manufacturers, distributors, dealers, or importers of firearms or ammunition for damages, 
injunctive or other relief resulting from the misuse of their products by others.”542  Her other 
promise on this aspect of gun control is to “revoke the licenses of bad-actor dealers,” by 
increasing funding to the ATF for inspections of gun stores and “aggressively enforce current 
law by revoking the licenses of dealers that knowingly supply straw purchasers and 
traffickers.”543   
 The third aspect of her campaign promises regarding gun control involves enacting new 
laws and enforcing current laws that “keep guns out of the hands of domestic abusers, other 
violent criminals, and the severely mentally ill.”544  Clinton says that she would fight for 
legislation that expands federal laws preventing domestic abusers from buying or owning guns to 
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“convicted stalkers and people in dating relationships.”545  She also would urge Congress to 
“make straw purchasing a federal crime.”546 
 These promises, should they come to fruition, would do a great deal to limit gun violence 
in the United States.   Many of them are the middle-of–the-road, “common-sense” measures that 
the majority of the public supports, like closing the internet and gun show loophole and making 
background checks for gun buyers more stringent.  However, most of these promises rely on the 
goodwill of Congress to pass legislation that will curb the power of the gun lobby and create 
more restrictions for gun purchasers.  Should Mrs. Clinton be elected and the balance of 
Republicans to Democrats in Congress remain relatively static, she will likely face the same 
resistance to new gun policy measures that President Obama has encountered in his two terms as 
president.  The failure of the bipartisan background check bill in 2013 shows that Congress has 
very little interest in acting decisively on this issue, even when the policy would be supported by 
the majority of the American public and in response to a major, well-publicized shooting 
incident where mobilization for further gun control measures had occurred. 
 The other Democratic frontrunner, Senator Bernie Sanders, has had a far less decisive 
stance on gun control than former Secretary of State Clinton.  As a senator from Vermont, a rural 
state that, although heavily Democratic, is also pro-gun-rights, his voting record on gun control 
measures reflects the desires of many of his constituents.  Senator Sanders voted against the 
Brady Bill five times during his time in Congress and voted in favor of the NRA-backed instant 
background check bill that, had it been passed, would have killed the Brady Bill.547  He did, 
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however, vote for the failed 2013 bipartisan bill that would have expanded background checks 
for all firearms sales and prohibit straw purchasers.548 
 He also voted for the 2005 Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act, which former 
Secretary of State Clinton seeks to repeal should she be elected.  Senator Sanders has previously 
described the Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act as “protecting gun manufacturers 
from being held responsible if a murderer uses a gun to kill someone—just as a hammer 
company should not be held responsible if somebody used a hammer as a weapon.”549  This is a 
gross mischaracterization of the Act.  It actually provides gun manufacturers a legal shield from 
liability in negligence claims that most other manufacturers of consumer goods do not have.550  
Additionally, Senator Sanders voted against the appropriation of funding for the Centers of 
Disease Control and Prevention to research the public health effects of gun violence.551  Overall, 
his voting record on gun control during his time in Congress is abysmal.  
 He has since adapted his position to be more pro-gun-control for his presidential 
campaign, but he is still to the right of Mrs. Clinton on this issue.  It is notable that Senator 
Sanders does not include gun control in the “issues” section of his campaign website, but does 
include detailed summaries of his policy stance on matters such as “General Electric paying to 
restore the Hudson River” and “fighting for the rights of Native Hawaiians.”552  On a volunteer-
run website, feelthebern.org, which has collected quotes from Senator Sanders about gun control, 
among other issues, he positions himself as someone who believes in “…a middle-ground 
solution in the national gun debate.”553  His views on gun control relegate legislative 
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responsibility to “individual states, with the exception of instant background checks to prevent 
firearms from finding their way into the hands of criminals and the mentally ill, and a federal ban 
on assault weapons.”554  Regarding manufacturer liability, he believes that “gun manufacturers 
should not be held liable for the misuse of their products, just as any other industry isn’t held 
accountable for how end-consumers use their products.”555  In this statement, he wilfully ignores 
the true implications of the Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act, which expands 
protections of gun manufacturers from liability which manufacturers of other products do not 
share. 
The two front-runners for the Republican nomination, Donald Trump and Ted Cruz, are 
strongly against further gun control measures being enacted.  The page on Trump’s website that 
discusses his policy stance on guns is titled “Protecting our Second Amendment Rights Will 
Make America Great Again.”556  He advocates for enforcing current laws by “get[ting] serious 
about prosecuting violent criminals” and “empower[ing] law-abiding gun owners to defend 
themselves” through concealed carry, among other measures.557 
Ted Cruz is campaigning on his record of uncompromising support for gun rights.  He is 
endorsed by Gun Owners of America, a group that is to the right of the NRA, and holds an A+ 
rating from the NRA itself.558   In televised debates, he has highlighted his role in blocking the 
2013 Manchin-Toomey bill, saying in January during a GOP Fox Business Network Debate, that 
“there’s a reason when Barack Obama and Chuck Schumer came after our right to keep and bear 
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arms, that I led that opposition.  Along with millions of Americans, we defeated that gun control 
legislation.559   
He has consistently been in favor of expanding and protecting gun rights.  While he 
served as the Solicitor General of Texas, he wrote an amicus brief for D.C. v. Heller, the 2008 
Supreme Court case that struck down the District of Columbia’s handgun ban, in support of the 
respondent.560  Should either Republican candidate be elected, it seems clear that there will be no 
action to enact gun control measures in the next four years. 
III. Potential Policy Strategies 
Focus on “Common-Sense” Gun Laws that Can Be Supported by Gun Owners 
Michael Bloomberg’s PAC, Everytown for Gun Safety, and Gabrielle Giffords’ PAC, 
Americans for Responsible Solutions, are two policy actors that have come more recently to the 
gun control issue.  Although these organizations are relatively new, they have quickly realized 
the importance of framing their missions in a way that seeks to harness the support of gun 
owners.  Everytown for Gun Safety has focused on “common-sense steps that will save lives,” 
and has created specific initiatives to include “mayors, moms, cops… gun owners, and everyday 
Americans” in the group’s efforts—not all of them constituencies traditionally regarded as pro-
gun-control.561  Their policy goals are, for the most part, the very same issues that receive 
majority approval in public opinion polls.  The organization’s key initiatives are “requir[ing] a 
criminal background check for every gun sale,” “pushing Congress and state legislatures to close 
the loopholes that make it easy for domestic abusers to get guns without a background check,” 
“develop[ing] technology and laws that make safe storage [of guns] the norm,” and the passage 
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of “a strong federal trafficking law [that would] enable law enforcement to crack down on gun 
traffickers—and keep guns off our streets.”562  Everytown’s justifications for their policy goals 
are all carefully framed in a way that links irresponsible gun use to criminals only, protects the 
safety of vulnerable women and children, and enables police officers to enforce the law—goals 
that, theoretically, everyone should be able to support.  
Gabrielle Giffords’ PAC, Americans for Responsible Solutions, also emphasizes 
“commonsense [sic] solutions to protect our communities from gun violence.”563  Like 
Everytown for Gun Safety, Americans for Responsible Solutions advocates for expanding the 
background check system by closing the gun show and private seller loopholes, preventing 
domestic violence homicides by “…extending current firearms prohibitions to abusive dating 
partners and those convicted of misdemeanor stalking,” encouraging Congress to “work to make 
gun trafficking a federal crime and ensure enhanced penalties for kingpin gun traffickers, corrupt 
gun dealers and straw purchasers,” and investing in dedicated funding for research about the 
causes and impact of gun violence.564  Ms. Giffords and her husband, Mark Kelly, emphasize 
their own status as “gun owners and strong supporters of the Second Amendment…[who] know 
we must protect the rights of Americans to own guns for collection, recreation, and 
protection.”565 
Since these two groups target demographics that are not normally involved in gun-
control, it is possible that they could help normalize a centrist approach to gun control and turn 
their policy goals into legislative norms.   
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Targeting Elections  
 Some pro-gun control groups have begun to engage in campaign funding for candidates 
sympathetic to their goals, while also funding attack ads against opponents of gun control.  These 
are tactics that the NRA has been using since the late 1970s with great success, but pro-gun-
control groups have only recently begun to replicate these strategies.  Michael Bloomberg’s 
super PAC, Independence USA, has directed millions of dollars since its creation in October 
2012 to pro-gun-control candidates, helping them to win elections.  As previously discussed in 
Chapter 2, Independence USA contributed more than $2 million to Robin Kelly, a Congressional 
candidate from Illinois who ran against Debbie Halvorson, the incumbent, who held an “A” 
rating from the NRA, in 2013.566  Kelly won 52% of the vote.567   
 After its initial success in 2013 with Congresswoman Kelly, Independence USA 
furthered its involvement in supporting candidates who are willing to act decisively on gun 
control, but has shifted its attention to state and local candidates.  A 2014 statement from 
Howard Wolfson, an advisor to Bloomberg’s PAC, said that:  
Earlier this cycle, Mike Bloomberg concluded that a broken Washington would 
likely remain broken…and decided to direct significant resources to assist moderate 
Democrats and Republicans instead. This strategy paid off…No other individual 
spent as much money in support of both Republican and Democratic candidates, 
and no one had as much success at the state level in backing successful candidates 
from both parties.568 
 
 In the 2014 election cycle, Independence USA spent over $20 million to support the 
gubernatorial campaigns of Dan Malloy and John Hickenlooper, among others, who “…acted 
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after the Newtown shooting to pass commonsense gun safety measures—and showed that they 
could be re-elected despite attacks from the gun lobby.”569  Independence USA also supported a 
ballot measure in Washington State to strengthen criminal background checks for gun buyers.570 
 After Everytown for Gun Safety was founded in 2014, Bloomberg pledged $50 million to 
the organization.571  Both Everytown for Gun Safety and Americans for Responsible Solutions 
are 501(c)(4) organizations which a CNN report characterizes as an “…IRS classification used to 
raise unlimited amounts of money to influence voters.”572  This classification for these two 
organizations allows them to have the same fundraising capabilities as the lobbying arm of the 
NRA.  The financial and ideological commitment to gun control of these two groups are finally 
on par with that of the NRA, which spent over $32.5 million on campaigns and lobbying in 
2015.573  The funding that these two groups are able to commit to supporting pro-gun control 
candidates and “common-sense” gun control policies that are uncontroversial among the 
American public could allow gun-control policy to escape the toxic stigma that elected 
representatives fear will end their careers should they support it. 
A Way Forward Through the Courts? 
 In a way forward that could potentially bypass Congressional paralysis on gun control, 
some gun-control advocates have begun to work around federal laws that protect the gun lobby.  
Families of ten of the children who were murdered in the 2012 Sandy Hook Elementary School 
shooting have sued Remington Arms, the manufacturer of the Bushmaster assault rifle that Adam 
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Lanza used in the shooting, as well as Camfour, Remington’s distributor, and Riverview Gun 
Sales, where Lanza’s mother purchased the assault rifle.574  The wrongful death lawsuit 
ultimately seeks an injunction that would prevent the Bushmaster from being sold to the public 
because “…it is a military assault weapon designed for war.”575   
 Although Bushmaster had the case moved to federal court after it was filed, hoping to 
find a more sympathetic ear, the U.S. District Judge who heard the case, Robert Chatigny, sent it 
back to Bridgeport, Connecticut’s State Superior Court in September 2015.576  Remington has 
sought to have the case dismissed, saying that the company is immune under the 2005 Protection 
of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act, but the plaintiffs have put forward an entrustment exemption, 
which can hold a party liable should that party entrust its product to a second party who uses it to 
harm someone else.577  Although Remington is still fighting to have the case dismissed, a trial 
date has been set for April 2018 and the judge administering the case has allowed discovery to 
proceed.578   
Should this case continue, it will be the first to make it to the discovery phase since the 
2005 Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act was signed into law.579  This case has the 
possibility to create a precedent for other victims’ families to work around the Protection of 
Lawful Commerce in Arms Act and legally challenge gun manufacturers in the future.  If these 
cases continue to be litigated, and if they are ever won, they have the potential to become an 
impetus for gun safety laws and restrictions on who is eligible to buy certain classes of firearms, 
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or even subject certain firearms to a ban.  If gun manufacturers are found liable for the injuries 
and deaths of shooting victims, it seems likely that the gun lobby could be more of an 
embarrassment than a friend to members of Congress. 
Although the current outlook for Congressional action on gun control is grim, action from 
PACS and through the courts could potentially compel elected representatives to act on this issue 
while minimizing the political backlash involved when taking a decisive stance on gun control. 
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